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The purpose of this dissertation was to study the institutional transmission mechanism of the limited-
access social order in Kenya. This was motivated by the theory of new institutional economics, which 
views differences in institutions as fundamental in explaining differences in the level of economic 
development across countries. However, this theory often faces criticism in as far as it provides weak or 
no evidence pertaining to the direction of causality between institutions and economic development. This 
is because the theory tends to neglect the problems of political instability and the process state formation. 
In the social order framework, the problems of violence and instability underpin state formation and 
consequently institutional development. The limited access theory suggests that openness to the political 
and economic spheres of influence at early stages of development serves to increase instability and the 
level of violence in a society, and this may lead to a deteriorating quality of institutions, hence further 
economic stagnation. Using the theoretical framework of social orders and public choice theory a Vector 
Autoregressive Model was applied in order to evaluate this prediction of the limited access order theory. 
The results indicate that in inheriting colonial institutions and using them to bolster their elite networks 
through patronage, African leaders invariably inherited the contradictions embodying colonial rule, 
whereby open access to customary economic rights is disruptive to elite capital accumulation, thereby 
leading to political instability. Additionally, while the literature on postcolonial African states suggests that 
colonial institutions have been persistent, the results indicate that postcolonial Kenya has better 
institutions than colonial Kenya, in terms of economic and political rights. Moreover while the theory 
mainly attributes violence to elite competition, the findings highlight the importance the increase in 







This dissertation uses and slightly extends the theoretical framework of social orders of North, Wallis, 
and Weingast (2006; and 2009) with insights from public choice theory in order to analyse the evolution 
of political and economic institutions in limited access order societies. Specifically it seeks to analyse how 
the internal logic of a limited access society transmits itself into a country‟s political and economic 
institutions. In doing so, this dissertation drops the assumption that a social order in a certain territorial 
boundary (i.e. a country) is underpinned by a nation state which has a legitimate monopoly on systemic 
violence. Instead, it analyses the process through which the monopolization of legitimate force is attained 
and in turn how the nation state, along with its institutions, emerges. Generally, an institutional structure 
based on a limited access order seeks to achieve political and economic stability through limiting access to 
political and economic institutions. Limiting access, in economic terms, is imposing entry barriers in 
economic and political institutions in order to limit competition, thereby creating and maintaining 
economic rents for the political elite. Circumscribing access to the economic and political spheres of 
influence, in turn, serves to limit and regulate competition and to instil incentive-compatibility conditions 
among powerful individuals in society in order to achieve political stability. The powerful members of 
society are defined by their ability to stabilize or destabilize a broad-based, voluntary, incentive-
compatible, market system of creating and distributing economic rents. In particular, power is 
characterised by the ability of individuals or groups to exert or withstand (hold out) violent coercion. The 
hallmark of the theory is that it allows an analysis of political and economic institutions that define access 
to political power and the extent of economic competition and the division of labour (Wegner, 
Mechergui, and Mechergui, 2013).   
 The economic development and the new institutional economics (NIE) literature has reached a 
broad consensus that institutional differences are likely to explain the staggering differences in economic 
development among nations. This consensus, however, does not extend to the specific set of institutions 
which enable some countries and not others to achieve advanced levels of economic development (Khan, 
2013). Some commentators claim that open and stable political and economic institutions, such as 
representative democratic and strong property rights systems are necessary or sufficient for the 
development and advancement of market-based economic systems. This is because open and stable, 
economic and political institutions serve to reduce uncertainty, and therefore transaction costs, while also 
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enabling long-term planning and investment (Bardan, 1989). These arguments and observations in the 
literature suggest that economic development is a function of institutional development. In contrast 
however, other authors claim that institutional development, characterised by openness in stable political 
and economic institutions, requires economic development (Khan, 2013). This counterargument holds 
that institutions that reduce transaction costs, such as property rights, themselves, in turn, entail 
transaction costs, which given their low levels of development and limited resources, cannot emerge in 
developing countries. This is because, for open, rule-based, economic and political systems to be 
formulated and operated thoroughly, they require an embedded, legitimate, and a well-resourced 
enforcement mechanism. For example, low levels of development often make it difficult to fight 
corruption and enforce formal rules, because of resource and incentive constraints (Khan, 2005). 
The framework adopted in this dissertation asserts that this conundrum of endogeneity between 
institutional and economic development can be overcome once it is admitted that institutions are 
underpinned by a system of governance which formulates, operates, and enforces institutions over a 
given territory (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009). This is because political and economic institutions do 
not exist exogenously of an enforcement mechanism, which in modern societies is the nation state. The 
nation state, in turn, also does not exist exogenously of its socio-political and socioeconomic 
idiosyncrasies. These, in turn, are driven by social orders and how each social order regulates competition 
over political, hence economic resources. Therefore in order to understand the emergence, evolution and 
persistence of institutions, as well as how these in turn affect economic development, it is important to 
consider the way societies establish an ordered political and economic structure, that is, a social order. 
This implies that how societies within a social order manage competition among competing interests 
determines the kind of institutions that can or cannot emerge, as well as the nature of their enforcement 
mechanism. And, these in turn determine the level of economic development in a society. The theoretical 
framework of social orders goes beyond the conventional insights of NIE, where transition societies need 
to adopt economic institutions that keep rent-seeking groups at bay and promote open competition as 
this argument assumes away many of the stability conditions of the political order, thereby giving a 
misleading hint of feasible paths of institutional development (Wegner, Mechergui, and Merchegui, 2013). 
In the case of Kenya, using a dataset containing property rights, political and civil liberties, as well as 
political instability,  spanning 130 years from 1880-2010, this dissertation seeks to analyse how the logic of 
managing competition among powerful groups through limited access shapes the emergence, evolution 
and persistence of political and economic institutions.  The rest of the paper is organized as follows; 
Section 1 presents the literature on social orders, section 2 presents the micro-economic foundations of 
social orders, section 3 presents an analysis on violence and state formation with a focus on the nature of 
the African state proposed in the literature. Section 4 presents an analysis on the role of violence in state 
formation. Section 5 presents an historical exposition governance and institutions in Kenya during the 
measurement period. Section 6 presents an empirical section on the transmission analysis of the LAO and 
institutions in Kenya. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:  SOCIAL ORDERS AND THE EMERGENCE 
OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
According to North et al. (2007), throughout all of human history, humans have devised only three ways 
of organizing societies, that is, social orders, which are self-sustaining and internally consistent. These are 
the primitive access order, the limited access order (LAO), and the open access order (OAO). In this 
theoretical framework, social orders are comprised of political, economic, cultural, religious, military 
systems or institutions. In defining institutions, North (2001; in North et al., 2007) argues that institutions 
are the written (de jure) and unwritten (de facto) „rules of the game‟, which encompass formal and 
informal norms of behaviour. Additionally, institutions also include mechanisms by which the rules are 
enforced as well as beliefs about how organizations and other individuals will behave (North et al., 2007).   
Social orders specify how individual competition over economic rents within and between institutions is 
managed. And, institutions of a certain social order, in turn, determine how other constituent institutions 
are organized within a society. More precisely, social orders are characterised by the way societies 
construct institutions that support the emergence of specific forms of organizations and the way societies 
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limit or permit access to organizations (North, Wallis and Weingast; 2009). This suggests that the 
likelihood that other kinds of institutions and their organizations will emerge within a certain society is 
determined by the incumbent institutions and organizations supported in that society (Mueller, 1989; and 
North et al., 2007). For example, North et al., (2007) argue that in LAOs, bureaucracies and judiciaries find 
it difficult, if not impossible, to deliver services impersonally. It is not necessarily the cause that 
bureaucrats are personally corrupt, but it is because they are embedded in a system of incentives, created 
by the social order, that offers them little opportunity to change (North et al., 2007).  
This in turn implies that, unless inventive-compatibility constraints have been eliminated, it is 
unlikely that open institutions and organizations, such as universal franchise and opposition parties, will 
emerge or operate as intended in societies based on a social order that supports institutions which limit 
access to organizations for its  immediate stability (North, Wallis, and Weingast; 2006 [emphasis added]). 
In this framework, organizations are defined as tools that individuals and groups, pursuing a mix of 
common and individual goals, use to increase their productivity. Moreover, organizations are created to 
coordinate the actions of many individuals and groups, and to dominate and coerce other individuals and 
groups (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). Furthermore, North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) assert that 
what is mainly common across social orders, and in turn what distinguishes them, is not their culture or 
institutions per se, but the way they limit and control violence. North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) argue 
that, all societies face the problem of violence, where the possibility that some individuals will be violent 
poses a central problem for any group of individuals. And,  since all societies possess institutions, 
organizations and beliefs which enable them to deal with violence with varying degrees of success, the 
systemic consideration of violence and the role it plays in shaping societies is fundamental to the problem 
of economic, political and social development (North et al., 2007).  This thereby gives impetus to 
understanding the rationale behind the use of violence in social orders.  
Oppenheimer (1926, 26) argues that “There are two fundamentally opposed means where man, 
requiring sustenance, is impelled to obtain the necessary means for satisfying his desires… (these are) 
work and robbery”. Moreover, Oppenheimer (1922, in Rothbard; 2009) defined production and exchange 
of one‟s own assets, is an economic means to wealth. While robbery, characterised by the seizure of 
another individual‟s goods and services by use of force and violence, is a political means to wealth. 
However, the use of force to transfer resources from one individual or group to another is fraught with 
paradoxes because warfare and other forms of violent coercion can destroy the very resources they seek 
to expropriate, thus rendering the process a negative sum game at worse or a zero sum game at best. That 
is, expropriation through violent coercion entails collateral damage, which is guaranteed to make at least 
one of the parties a loser and this might serve to inhibit long-run productive capacity (Anderson and 
Gifford, 2004). This implies that, unless a society establishes a peaceful order, there will be little or no 
production taking place because the victims of violence will have little incentive to produce goods and 
services as expropriation risk will be too high to do so (Olson, 1993). Establishing a society that fosters 
peace, specialisation and exchange; that is, fostering economic in contrast to political means of creating 
wealth, requires the creation of incentives for groups to compete peacefully rather than through violence ( 
North et al., (2007).  
However, elsewhere (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009) assert that no society solves the problem 
of violence by eliminating violence, implying that, at best, societies can only contain and manage violence. 
The analysis so far has given economic reasons as to why societies need to reduce the level of violence. 
What is left then is to determine when and how societies can attain reduced levels of violence. Elwert 
(2001) argues that it is the lack of monopoly of violence under competitive conditions that produces and 
maintains spaces open to violence-fields, whereby people invest in social and physical conditions of 
security in much higher proportions. In such societies individuals tend not to be preoccupied with 
development, growth, or productive innovation. This is because, at least in the short run, the return to 
political means of acquiring wealth is higher than the return to economic means of acquiring wealth. This 
suggests that, economic development cannot ensue in social orders where the monopolization of force 
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hasn‟t been attained. This conceptual framework then seeks to integrate a theory of economic behaviour 
with a theory of political behaviour by demonstrating how political systems manipulate the economy in 
order to attain and sustain political stability, limit violence through instilling social orders (Wegner, 
Mechergui, and Mechergui, 2013; and North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006). These social orders provide 
powerful members of society incentives to foster an environment that allows methods of rent 
appropriation that prevent the negative sum game characterised by coercive means of accumulating 
wealth. The rest of the section discusses the three social orders and how they limit violence, as well as 
how one order transits to another.  
 
2.1The Primitive Access Order 
In this framework, the primitive access order consists of hunter-gatherer type societies which are made up 
of many small social units with very little specialization and division of labour. The most important 
characteristic of this social order is that of high levels of violence levels, as there is no one person or 
group that has monopoly on systemic violence, and therefore systemic use of violence is likely to be 
between-group rather than within-group (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006). Small groups, relative to 
larger groups can easily solve the problem of collective action when it comes to peace and security as it is 
easier to impose sanctions on anti-social behaviour in small numbers. This is because it is easier to learn 
and predict the behaviour of other members in a small group, especially when it comes to responding to 
cooperative strategies of non-violent behaviour. Hence, the emergence of cooperative Pareto-optimal 
equilibria with regards to the provision of security is much more likely in such small groups relative to 
larger groups (Mueller, 1989). However, despite small groups being able to easily solve within-group 
collective action problems over the use of violence, given that there is no one group with a monopoly on 
violence, it is unlikely that the output of violence will be reduced between groups, as each group will find 
it optimal to dedicate some of its resources towards violence potential for conquest or for defence. 
Moreover, because the continuation of violence is embedded in the market for violence, this implies that, 
given that the lack of monopoly control over the use of violence, at best, groups under primitive access 
societies will have an oligopolistic market structure of violence, and at worst, a monopolistic competitive 
market system (Elwert, 2001). This  suggests that, it is highly unlikely that primitive access societies can 
sustainably reduce the use of predatory violence, and  hence achieve the levels of peace that are necessary 
for complex organizations which in turn are necessary for economic development characterising modern 
societies (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2006). This analysis suggests that even though groups in primitive 
access orders are able to solve within-group collective action problems, they are nonetheless unable to 
solve between-group collective action around the use of violent force. Furthermore this implies that 
primitive access social orders cannot achieve the level of economic development required to improve 
quality of life characterising contemporary societies because unregulated violence cannot result in the 
formulation of rules, more especially those which are necessary for economic growth (Mueller, 1989; 
Elwert, 2001; and Khan, 2017). 
 
2.1 The Limited Access Order  
The social relations are based on the reduction of violence as well as rules that govern those social 
relations. Under violence-free realms, in contrast to violence-fields, long-term investments in intellectual 
formation and means of production also make sense for persons far from the centres of power (Elwert, 
2001). The analysis so far suggests that unless societies reduce their levels of violence, they cannot form 
complex organizations which are necessary for voluntary exchange, investment, market formation and 
economic development. To achieve reduced violence and economic progress, an elemental organization 
with centralized power, comprised of a web of relationships that make up credible commitments within a 
dominant coalition is necessary. In order to solve the problem of violence, the LAO uses the political 
system in order to create and control the distribution of rents in a manner that enhances incentives for 
violence specialists to engage in rule-based behaviour in contrast exerting violence to fulfilling their own 
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personal ambitions (North et al., 2011). In order to reduce the level of violence, LAOs have to generate 
sustainable economic rents for their powerful members as the dissemination of rents is the basis for 
political stability. This is achieved through throttling competition by limiting access to valuable political 
and economic institutions (North et al., 2007). Furthermore, the LAO appears to be the means by which 
all but a handful of societies have secured order and limited violence for the last ten thousand years, 
where powerful individuals, possess privileges and rents, and where the risk of losing the rents makes it in 
the interests of these powerful individuals and groups to cooperate rather than to fight. The creation and 
granting of privileged access to economic rents through privileged access to political institutions provides 
an incentive to violence specialists to halt the violence for a given level of potential economic gains. 
Thereafter, powerful individuals gain access to social tools which enable them, and only them to form 
powerful organizations which manipulate the economy to create rents as a means of solving the problem 
of violence (North et al, 2007). This argument concurs with Olson (1993), who argued that the 
monopolization of theft and the protection of tax generating subjects, that is, the monopolization of 
violence and provision of security serves to eliminate anarchy and the regular outbursts of violence.   
North et al. (2007) and North et al. (2011) argue that historically, LAOs were a great innovation 
over the hunter-gatherer societies‟ primitive order as they allowed the formation of large and complex 
civilizations with substantial specialization, exchange and wealth. While LAOs vary enormously, both in 
composition as well as in outcomes for development, all share the basic principle of using the political 
system to manipulate the economy to produce rents, while generating stability and preventing violence 
(North, 2011 and Mkandawire, 2015). In the analogy of Olson (1993), the stationary bandit in contrast to 
the roving bandit has an incentive to provide security of a wide variety for his subjects. This implies that 
any organization with significant degree of control over a country will provide public goods as it has an 
encompassing interest in it. In LAOs, that public good is security from the predatory use of violence 
(Olson, 1993). Rothbard (2009) asserts that in order for the ruling class to preserve its monopoly of 
predation, it needs to see to it that private, systemic crime, especially one that involves the use of violence, 
was kept to a minimum. This is especially true when it comes to preventing brain drain under weak 
barriers to international labour mobility.  This suggests that far from merely being a service to interest 
groups, limited access to the political and economic systems and rent seeking behaviour of government 
officials may be a solution to the problem of violence (North et al, 2007). 
 In this framework, LAOs are to be distinguished by their degree of openness concerning 
economic organizations, political organization and the distribution of the capacity for violence. While 
LAOs may appear incompatible with conventional ideals of openness and competitively driven efficiency, 
more openness to either the economic or the political spheres would weaken the rent-creation system that 
hold the LAO together. Openness therefore risks increasing violence and a reversion back to political 
instability and the stagnation or deterioration of development (North et al., 2011).  In this framework, 
conceptualising societies as access orders corroborated by the logic of violence has provided a way of 
integrating economic behaviour with a theory of political behaviour, demonstrating how political systems 
manipulate the economy in order to sustain political stability, limit violence and provide social order. 
Moreover this framework allows us to link social and state formation, with institutional development, 
hence potentially allowing us to better understand why certain institutions tend to persist even as they 
erode developmental aspirations, and why seemingly obvious solutions may actually prove to be perverse. 
The persistence of growth-inhibiting institutions may be explained by the notion that reform towards 
open economic and political institutions may serve to render bleakly any prospects of economic 
development through their destabilizing effects on the incumbent social order (North, Wallis, and 
Weingast, 2006). Since rent creation and distribution in the LAO may be underpinned by growth-
inhibiting, but politically stabilizing institutions, a more fundamental opening of markets and political 
rights may be perilous to the privileges of the elite coalition (Wegner, Mechergui, and Mecherghui, 2013). 
In LAOs, the pressure for institutional openness has to be weighed against the pursuit of elite privileges 
and the promotion of economic development and political stability (Wegner, Mechergui, and Mechergui, 
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2013). This argument for open economic and political institutions, assumes that the mere absence of 
democratic and market enhancing institutions is the reason for economic stagnation, and some 
commentators refute this assumption (Khan, 2012). Nonetheless, since open institutions may be 
incongruous with the logic of a limited access order, whether or not they a sufficient for economic 
development, they will tend to be opposed by the dominant coalition, and even in the case where they are 
sufficient for economic growth, “bad” institutions are likely to persist.  
Limited Access Orders come in three different variations, fragile, basic and mature. The 
differentiation is mainly in terms of the degree of access to violence as well as the sophistication and 
variety of organizations within the State, i.e dominant coalition,  and externally to it (North et al. 2007). 
The level of sophistication is determined by the ability of firms to remain viable under Schumpeterian 
competition. In a fragile LAO, the state has lost legitimacy over the monopoly of violence and is barely 
functional in the face of internal and external violence. Under such an order, violence is a principal 
determinant of the distribution of rents and resources. This social order is also referred to in the 
literature, as primitive accumulation society, where each faction within the dominant coalition has direct 
access to violence (Khan, 2013). Given their instability, fragile LAOs have simple institutional structures 
for the state, and cannot support private elite organizations (North et al., 2007).  In basic limited access, 
the state is stable and well established in comparison to the fragile LAO and is generally able to reduce 
violence outbreak. Under fragile LAOs, the only durable organization is the state itself, and elite rights 
and privileges are closely identified with it. And, even though there may be complex organizations, they 
are usually within the direct ambit of the state. This ensures that the potential for violence and 
renegotiation power remains within the dominant coalition. In the basic LAO, emergent institutions serve 
to organize the internal relations of the state and its relations with members of the dominant coalition. 
Here again, barriers to entry to the political and economic spheres serve as a socio-political and 
socioeconomic stabilizing factor. Lastly, in basic limited access societies, with the help of the state, private 
individuals can enjoy monopoly or oligopolistic rents in economic sectors. Therefore, since private 
organizations tend to be closely tied to the state, this may potentially inhibit their level of sophistication 
(North et al., 20011).In the mature LOA, the government supports a large variety of private organizations, 
which can also enjoy imperfect competition rents. The mature LAO has durable institutional structures 
for the State, a well-articulated body of public law that specifies the offices and functions of the State, and 
can support a wide range of elite organizations that exist apart from the State. However, the proximity of 
these private organizations to the State is such that, they cannot be sophisticated enough to be 
independent and bargain for better institutions (North et al. 2007). 
 
2.3 Limited Access and Patronage 
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) argue that throughout recorded history, the cessation of violence is 
not achieved when powerful members cease to fight, but rather peace occurs when the powerful 
members devise arrangements that reduce the level of violence. To achieve peace, the LAO is built on 
personal relationships through repeated interaction among powerful individuals. This leads to the 
formation of a social hierarchy with the powerful individuals at the top of the social order. Here, status 
and hierarchy tend to be defined in terms of social persona that is unique to individuals. Since LAOs exist 
in order to reduce violence and extend security, some protection regarding property and physical security 
is extended to non-elites, and such protection is often extended through patronage or client networks 
(North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006 and 2009). Since the monopolization of force is not enough to achieve 
stability and development, and even though LAO regimes may not provide fundamental rights such as 
freedom of speech or equality before the rule of law, they cannot solely rely on repression. To some 
extent they depend upon legitimacy within the population. Legitimacy may be achieved through economic 
development and a share in national income for the wider part of the population (Wegner, Mechergui, 
and Mechergui, 2009). This might explain why it is hard to attribute economic development to polity. To 
ensure the stability of the non-democratic regime, rulers may be interested in promoting trade and 
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industry in order to raise productivity (Wegner, Mechergui, and Mechergui, 2013). However, in order to 
create a LAO with the ability to provide security to non-elites, powerful members must be incentivised to 
do so and this might mean that fully fledged economic competition might be circumscribed (Wegner, 
Mechergui, and Mechergui, 2009). Scott (1969; in Arriola, 2009) argues that, earlier scholars suggested 
that the distribution of patronage has been a tool used to pull together a heterogeneous elite and to build 
institutions over the long term. This pooling of powerful members through patronage, in turn, has 
directly contributed to the building of some of the most effective political parties and most stable political 
systems (Huntington, 1968; in Arriola, 2009). This is because the patronage system creates incentive-
compatible arrangements between powerful groups that bind their interests to the continued existence of 
political stability and the state (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2006). This suggests that if limited access is 
to be understood as a solution to the problem of violence, patronage is a series of steps undertaken to 
arrive at that solution (Arriola, 2009).   
However, the literature also highlights the deleterious effects of patronage and clientelist regimes 
on the economy and at times even on the state itself. The main objection to patronage is that is crowds-
out capitalist forms of accumulation. When clientelism is pervasive, the state actively undermines 
capitalist accumulation where property rights are imperfectly respected (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994). 
This in turn acts as a disincentive towards private entrepreneurship and long-run productive investments 
and increases the level of uncertainty in a market economy (Olson, 1993). Citizens outside the elite 
factions have an incentive to avoid complex economic plans that requires administrative permissions, and 
invariably the donation of bribes (Wegner, Mechergui, and Mechergui, 2013). Engelbert (2000) asserts 
that rulers dispense patronage as a cheap way to consolidate power, and this requires perpetual access to 
rents, and entails a preference for distribution (or re-distribution) over long-term investment. North, 
Wallis, and Weingast (2006), assert that despite the LAO‟s ability to promote trade, the necessity of 
creating rents among violence specialists to promote stability produces an inherent tendency for the 
natural state to create market power and restrict competition, and this may serve to stifle the economic 
rights of non-elites. As argued above, this suggests that highly inefficient organizations and firms are likely 
to persist under systems of patronage, with deleterious effects with regards to long term economic 
development. Accordingly, a prosperous market economy cannot grant economic privileges to groups 
because innovative competition results in a permanent revaluation of economic assets including the 
“creative destruction‟ of economic sectors (Wegner, Mechergui, and Mechergui, 2013). The logic of the 
LAO is to prevent this process of creative destruction so that the destruction of political stability may be 
averted. Lastly, the literature highlights that the Achilles Heel of patronage regimes is finance because 
they tend to have a structural tendency for fiscal crises (Mkandawire, 2015). This is because, to service 
their clientelistic networks or to ensure their legitimacy, power rulers must spend money excessively, and 
at times inefficiently in order to create job and this tends to lead to bloated bureaucracies (Mkandawire, 
2015).  
 
2.4 Open Access Order 
The last social order in this framework is the open access order.  Unlike the LAO,  the Open Access 
Order (OAO) relies on competition, open access to organizations and the rule of law to hold society 
together; making use of competition and institutions, including consolidated political control over all 
organizations with the potential for major violence ( North  et al, 2007). Unlike Limited or Primitive 
Access orders, OAOs have sophisticated public and private organizations as there are no barriers to entry 
in either in the political or economic milieu, where open access to politics sustains open access to the 
economic system and vice versa (North et al., 2007). North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) argue that OAOs 
reduce or eliminate the use of violence as a means of political and economic competition, and in doing so, 
open up the ability for society to compete on other margins, such as price, quality or votes. Moreover, in 
contrast to the circumscribed political and economic access in LAOs, open access and competition are 
the means through which OAOs solve the problem of violence (North et al., 2011). Perhaps even more 
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importantly, in OAOs, the state as a distinct organization has monopoly over systemic violence (North et 
al., 2011). Lastly, a distinguishing feature of OAOs to other social organizations is the fact that under 
OAOs, access to political and economic institutions are impersonal and the rule of law tends to be 
enforced impartially on all citizens (North et al., 2007). According to this conceptual framework of social 
orders, it is only when states have transitioned to an open access order are they said to have developed, 
both economically and politically. Accordingly, North, et al. (2007 and 2011) define development is a 
movement along the spectrum of LOAs and the transition from an LOA to an OAO as this movement 
has generally increased productivity and incomes.  
 
3. MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF LIMITED ACCESS 
 
The foundation of limited access is its solution to the problem of violence (North et al., 2007). Since the 
continuation of violence is dependent on the market of violence, an analysis of how markets for violence 
reduce or fail to reduce the level of violence is exigent in understanding the emergence, evolution and 
stability of LOAs. So far the analysis has been elaborate on the social structures that are conducive to 
peaceful forms of rent creation and distribution, but has been silent on the mechanism from which such a 
peaceful of an outcome is derived. This section aims to extend the theoretical framework of North, Wallis 
and Weingast (2009) by elaborating on the economic and political logic driving the emergence of LAOs. 
North et al. (2007) assert that the systemic use of violence underpins social, economic and political 
formation. The systemic use of violence, as mentioned above, in turns depends on the market structure of 
violence (Elwert, 2001). These arguments suggest that in order to understand socioeconomic and socio-
political formation, or political economy, it is imperative to understand the systemic use of violence, 
which in turn requires an understanding of the markets of violence. Specifically, this requires the 
understanding of which market structures for violence are endogenously likely or less likely to lead to a 
reduction in the level of violence. In his study of anarchy, Bush (1972) characterises violence as an 
economic bad for those consumers who consume it it to acquire wealth from others. The marginal utility 
of violence is negative, because the effort involved in violent coercion is an assumed to be an unpleasant 
commodity. However, since violence is used as a means to acquire or secure wealth, the marginal utility 
from the income received or secured through holding out violence with violence (i.e defence),  is assumed 
to be positive (Bush 1972). This analysis, likewise, considers violence as an economic bad for its 
consumers. Moreover, violence can be given the same treatment as a negative externality like pollution. 
This is because, the consumption of violence usually leads to violence-fields, thereby creating instability 
and an increase in the level of collateral damage which imposes spill-over costs for those not directly 
engaged in the conflict.  
 As mentioned above, use of violence to protect against violence entails paradoxes, because any 
agency employed to successfully protect wealth and life from attack also necessarily would have the 
capacity to take either (Davidson and Mogg-Rees, 1997). On this point, Olson (1993) argued that 
individuals need their property and contract rights protected from violation not only by other individuals 
in the private sector, but also by the entity that has the greatest powers in society. Normally competition 
is advocated as a driver in product quality and reliability, as it usually leads to an increase in consumer 
surplus. However, in the case of violence, direct competition often has perverse results. This is because 
open rivalry between actors of violence is translated into more violence, as individuals tend to respond to 
violence with violence (Mehler, 2004). Consequently, this could lead to the plundering of the customers 
who pay for the service in the first place where the increasing use of violence leads to an increase in the 
level of collateral damage; herein lays the contradiction (Davidson and Mogg-Rees, 1997).  Mehler (2004) 
argues that the open security market offers few advantages for the customer because there is no real 
freedom of choice between the different violence specialists providing security. When there is open 
competition for dominance, the use of violence will be less restricted against the population at large, and 
more so against the adversary. Consequently, is only arrangements between different security providers 
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(i.e. violence specialists) that appear to lead to a relatively low level of violence between them. And, in 
order to reduce the use of violence requires a small number of violence specialists‟ organizations to 
provide the total amount of security. That is, a strategy of co-operative maximization of gains among 
violence specialists that will result in a cartelization of the market for violence (Mehler, 2004).    
Since the continuation of violence is embedded in its market structures, it is suggestive that the 
discontinuation of violence is likely to result in market structures in which there is less competition in the 
provision of violence, that is, a market structure with a high degree of concentration (Davidson and 
Mogg-Rees, 1997);  Elwert, 2001); and Mehler, 2004). As an example, unless competition is imperfect over 
the use of violence, it is highly unlikely that there will be a prevalence of violence. This is because, in a 
market structure with the assumptions of perfect competition, there is unrestricted access to the same 
standardised good, there is no asymmetry in information about each individual‟s potential for violence 
and everyone is a price-taker. This implies that no one can influence their uncertainty over loss of 
property and life upon the consumption violence, as there are so many other producers of violence 
(powerful members) that each consumer constitutes a negligible portion of the whole (Bush, 1972). This 
reduces the consumption of violence to individualistic decision making. Under perfect competition then, 
the analysis suggests there will be no returns to the use of violence, and at best its use will be a negative 
sum game (Mueller, 1989). More importantly, in such a society where there is perfect competition over 
the use of force, there can be no state formation as the state is an entity that attempts to attain and 
maintain a monopoly of the use of force and violence (Rothbard, 2009).  In contrast to perfect 
competition then, is a complete concentration on the use of force, that is, a monopoly over violence. The 
analysis given above on LAO and OAOs, provides reasons as to why monopolists of violence will find it 
optimal to reduce the output of violence. These conditions of optimality are contained in Olson‟s (1993) 
stationary bandit hypothesis, Rothbard‟s (2009) theory of predation, as well as North et al.’s (2011) 
stability-driven rent creation and distribution logic of LOA. These authors all provide examples of how 
and why the monopolization of force will lead to reduced levels of violence.  
Of particular interest, especially in the case of developing countries, are oligopoly and monopolistic 
competitive markets of violence. Under monopolistic competition, there a numerous participants in the 
market for violence, there are no entry barriers, there is perfect information and the product is non-
standardised. Under these crucial assumptions, this suggests that consumers of violence will perceive the 
high returns from the consumption or use of violence, be it in predation or in protection against coercive 
expropriation of assets, whereupon, the outcomes will likely be zero-sum gains, as well as somewhat 
negative sum gains. What distinguishes the monopolistic competitive market relative to the perfectly 
competitive market is that in the monopolistic competitive market it‟s possible that least one of the 
parties who consumes violence stands to gain (ex ante), whereas in the perfectly competitive market for 
violence, the use of violence will result in negative sum gains (Mueller, 1989: 9). Lastly, there is the 
oligopolistic market for violence. 
 In oligopolistic market structures there are few producers and many buyers, and several of these 
producers are large enough that they can influence the market price (Dodge, 2008). Oligopolies of 
violence come in different variations and forms and under different variations. An oligopolistic market of 
violence may either be an arrangement based oligopoly, a dominant leader oligopoly or a continuous 
adverse-competition oligopoly. The arrangement based oligopoly is characterised by the prevalence of 
cartels whereby, because of the conversational solutions to the strong competition among the members, 
they tend to produce less violent situations. Dominant leader oligopoly may encompass a weak but not 
yet collapsed state whereby its representatives control the capital and a certain perimeter outside of it, 
while other violence specialists provide “security” in zones not permanently under effective rule of the 
state (Mehler, 2004). The continuous adverse competition oligopoly, may be thought of as a fragile 
limited access order, characterised by a complete lack of monopoly over violence, such as a civil war. The 
key defining attribute of an oligopoly is that producers‟ decisions are mutually inclusive, that is, each 
producer‟s decisions affect the decisions of others (Dodge, 2008). This situation implies that firms are 
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often unable to carry out credible threats or in engaging in “irrational rationality”, where violence is 
merely expended as a signalling tool of violence potential, hence serving to reduce future potential violent 
outbursts ( Bates, Greif, and Singh, 2002; in Douglas et al., 2013). This is because, in among oligopolists, a 
threat is likely to harm the threatening firm if carried out because other firms have the capacity to 
retaliate, a situation commonly known as mutually assured destruction (Dodge, 2008).  The existence of 
mutually assured destruction guarantees that the level of violence will be reduced because preventing 
violence requires that the commitment not be fight to be credible on all sides. This situation is more likely 
in oligopolistic market structures for violence because oligopolistic producers cannot carry out credible 
threats with regards to the use of force, therefore their commitments not to fight will become credible 
(North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2006; and Dodge, 2008). This situation reduces the problem of violence 
from myopic individual utility-maximization decision-making to strategic interaction involving carefully 
calculated strategies among a wide variety of violence specialists on the viable use of force in rent-seeking 
(North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2006).  
 
3.1 Violence and Collective Action: Utiliy Under Anarchy 
According to Elwert (2001) markets for violence are economic areas dominated by wars and warlords 
such as generals, princes, militia chiefs and party leaders where a self-perpetuating system emerges and 
links non-violent commodity markets with the violent acquisition of goods. Since violence specialists 
utilize violence to fulfil economic aims, they are to be understood as entrepreneurs who use deliberate 
violence as an efficient tool for achieving economic aims. The paradox of the use of violence mentioned 
above suggests that there are conditions under which the use of violence is sub-optimal as a means to 
acquire economic rents (Anderson and Gifford, 2004). As such, optimal rent acquisition requires a 
collective initiative from violence specialist to contain violence in order reduce its destructive effects on 
economic productivity and human life. However, Olson (1993) argues that we cannot conclude that 
because everyone could gain from peaceful exchange, it will necessarily emerge by voluntary agreement, 
especially in large groups.  
When individuals in large groups are acting selfishly, it is highly unlikely that the incentive 
compatibility problems of collective choice will be solved. Hence, under such conditions, highly 
inefficient outcomes are more likely than Pareto optimal equilibria. Furthermore Mueller (1989) argues 
that, in anarchy, where there is no common power, such as a state with a monopoly on violence, we 
would expect that the Nash equilibria will be Pareto inefficient as the dominant strategy of each individual 
is to acquire violence potential both to protect and expropriate. This will result in a negative-sum game, as 
investment capacity towards productive goods and services towards gets crowed-out in favour of the 
production of an economic bad. However, under repeated interaction, it is likely that a cooperative 
solution will be reached, in which the violence specialists reduce the level of violence. Although, this is 
more likely in small groups than in large groups which characterise modern age nations (Mueller, 1989). 
From these arguments, as will be elaborated on below, we can deduce that markets for violence, in 
addition to determining the likelihood of the discontinuation of violence, they also determine and shape 
the outcome of social formation and its institutions. More importantly, violence-free social formation is 
unlikely to occur because of purely individualistic rational decision making. The provision of a peaceful 
and secure environment, as mentioned previously, is likely as a solution to collective action problems, and 
this requires cooperative behaviour (Olson, 1993). This implies that in order to understand the formation 
of social order and institutional development, it is important to first understand how individuals solve 
collective action problems in markets of violence. 
The analysis given above suggests that since spill-over costs of violence on society tend to result 
in more destructive violence-fields with grave consequences for third parties who constitute the rest of 
society, the provision of a peaceful and secure environment is a public good (Davidson and Ross-Meeg 
1987;  Mueller, 1989; and Mehler, 2004). This is because like a public good the provision of a peaceful 
and secure order has two features which characterise public goods. These are the jointness of supply and 
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the impossibility of excluding others once it has been supplied (Musgrave, 1959; in Mueller, 1989). That 
is, public goods have benefits that cannot easily be confined to a single buyer, which means that once they 
have been provided, many can enjoy them for free (Mehler, 2004).  An individual can simply choose to 
free ride, and thereby avoid the private costs that come from contributing in the provision of the good. 
Mueller (1989), Olson (1993) and Mehler (2004) suggest that, given their joint-supply property and the 
prospect for free riding, without a mechanism for collective action, these goods will often be under-
produced. This can be depicted by representing an oligopolistic market of violence as a prisoners‟ 
dilemma game of simultaneous strategic interaction.  
 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AS A PRISONERS‟ DILEMMA 
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Figure 1. Adapted from (Mueller, 1989) 
 
Using the analogy of Oppenheimer (1922), where two individuals or organizations, A and B,  have a 
choice between two means to acquire wealth, work and robbery, representing economic and political 
means respectively, it can be shown that the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome of this game will be 
Pareto sub-optimal. Given that the joint supply property entails costs for all those who cooperate in the 
provision of public goods, and because no one can be excluded from their consumption, each individual 
is better off if all but her contribute towards the provision. In figure 1 above, individuals, or organizations 
in the case of a large collection of individuals, are better-off if they use economic rather than political 
means to acquire wealth as this outcome has a higher pay-off for both individuals, and is Pareto optimal. 
However, the dominant strategy for both players is to use political means to wealth acquisition and this 
strategy constitutes the Nash equilibrium of the game with payoffs [8,8]** . As the outcome of the 
prisoner‟s dilemma game in  Figure 1 depicts, the Nash equilibrium does not require the equilibrium 
choices to be strictly better that other available choices, and therefore my not be in the best interests of 
the players. Indeed the Nash equilibrium of the game is not a social optimum equilibrium (Dixit, Skeath, 
and Reiley; 2009).  
In this game, the Nash equilibrium outcome results in payoffs of [8, 8]** for both players, and this 
is  Pareto inefficient. This is because, there is another equilibrium with payoffs [10, 9]## that makes both 
players better off without making any of them worse off, and thereby constitutes a Pareto optimal 
equilibrium and social optimum. Mueller (1989: 10) argues that, “Given [the] jointness of supply 
[condition], a cooperative consumption decision is necessary to provide the [public] good efficiently.” 
The jointness of supply property however, only creates the need for collective action to achieve Pareto 
optimality, it does not guarantee, given the need, that a cooperative outcome will result. This is because it 
is often impossible or impractical of excluding some individuals or groups from consuming a public good 
like a peaceful and secure, socioeconomic and sociopolicial order. The non-excludability property of a 
public good in turn, raises the probability that purely voluntary schemes for its provision will collapse 
(Mueller, 1989). Once a secure and peaceful environment has been attained, individuals may begin to 
invest in the production of welfare-enhancing economic goods, in contrast to attaining violence potential. 
This will result in high returns from the use of violence, which may prompt other individuals to use 
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incentive to “shoot first and talk later”, as they fear that others will fail to follow the rules and refrain 
from using political means of wealth acquisition (Wallis and Weingast, 2009; 19) . Consequently, this may 
serve to exacerbate the tendency towards the non-cooperative, Pareto-inefficient and social sub-optimum 
equilibrium, because those who use economic means to acquire wealth will deem it necessary to allocate 
some of their investment towards violence potential to defend their property. 
 In order for the strategic interaction to result in a cooperative equilibrium, Mueller (1989) argues 
that there needs to be punishment, or threat thereof, of non-cooperative behaviour. This is especially 
needed in large, heterogeneous communities or groups, where a formal statement of what behaviour is 
mutually beneficial and consistent with public interest may be needed. These insights provide a need to 
understand the process through which such a statement, or social contract, comes into existence. This is 
because its existence is a necessary precondition for the creation of other contracts which make up a 
system of economic and political institutions underpinning voluntary exchange (Mueller, 1989). In order 
to solve the free-rider problem induced by the non-excludability property of public goods, either the costs 
of free-riding have to be increased or the benefits of free-riding have to be decreased (Dixit, Skeath, and 
Reily, 2009). Consequently, the best response strategy of an individual, given that others are using 
economic means to acquire wealth, is to also use economic means to acquire wealth, in contrast to 
political means.  
This thereby transforms the collective-action problem as Prisoners‟ Dilemma game into a 
collective-action problem as an Assurance game, where at least one of the Nash equilibria of the game is a 
Pareto social-optimum, but this game may also need cooperation among the players (Dixit, Skeath, and 
Reiley, 2009).  Lastly, Bush (1972) provides a simplistic two consumer or two-group model which can be 
used to derive cooperative decision making congruous with halting and reducing the output of violence, 
hence the emergence of voluntary exchange, with negotiated terms of trade, allowed by the emergent 
institutions of property rights derived from the solution of containing violence (Mueller, 1989). That is, a 
Pareto efficiency improvement in an oligopolistic market for violence.     
 































Figure 2: Income-Effort Curve 
 
The model predicts that, given any initial distribution of income and no institutional or ethical barriers 
that prevent one individual or group from forcibly taking income from another group, a redistribution of 
income may arise, producing a new and modified distribution of income, which is referred to as the 
natural income; furthermore this model predicts that a Pareto superior distribution can be accomplished 
if both individuals agree to discontinue their level of effort (violence) to take income away from each 
other (Bush, 1972)  
In this model the social order is characterised by anarchy, something akin to a primitive access 
society, whereby individuals have no common power. This means there are no institutional or ethnical 
barriers that prevent one individual or group from forcibly expropriating property from another group as 
there is no state with a monopoly on force which can enforce these barriers. Hence this is a primitive 
access order with dominated by primitive accumulation, that is,  the use of violence as a primary means to 
acquire or retain wealth is prevalent (Khan, 2013). Such a society primarily uses political over economic 
means of wealth acquisition. Here, there is an initial distribution, X1, for individual 1, whereupon 





 E is the level of effort (i.e violence) expended towards predation or protection, and ai is the efficacy of 
effort. In this model the marginal utility of effort is negative while that of income is positive. Effort is 
expended only to the extent that it can be used to acquire or retain wealth. The necessary conditions for 
utility maximisation suggest that the marginal substitution of income for violence must equal the rate at 
which effort is used to acquire income. The equilibrium condition in the income-effort diagram above is 
determined by the intersection of the reaction curves of the two consumers, which is how much effort 
one consumer expends given the effort of the other. These reaction curves are positively related to each 
other (i.e. they are strategic complements), indicating that the use of violence necessarily prompts violent 
reaction as violence is a means to acquire wealth and to protect against coercive expropriation.  
Bush (1972) predicts that in societies characterised by a primitive access order, even though the 
natural distribution may not be the final distribution of income, since effort or violence is an unpleasant 
commodity for either individuals or groups, they would be willing to give up some of their natural income 
if they could simultaneously decrease their levels of violence. This is the situation in which a reduction of 
violence is achieved and economic forms of generating and distributing wealth ensue. More importantly, 
this model predicts that a Pareto improvement adjustment can be accomplished if both individuals agree 
to discontinue their level of effort to take income coercively from each other. Here a superior Pareto 
condition is characterised by zero levels of violence, and hence characterises a social-optimum solution. 
This Pareto superior adjustment is underpinned by the fact that effort expended by any individual is a bad 
for them and for other members of society, hence both individuals would be willing to give up some of 
their natural income if this ensures the provision of a secure and peaceful environment to acquire 
additional wealth (Bush, 1972). In hindsight of the destructive effects of violence, and in foresight of their 
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own preservation and higher social welfare, violence specialists are predicted to introduce institutional 
restraints on the use of violence. 
 This introduction of institutional restraints, among violence specialists is akin to acknowledging 
the costs of free-riding to the social optimum outcomes. In the model, this Pareto superior move is 
shown by the decrease in natural income for individual 1, from X*1 to X
0
1, which is accompanied by a 
decrease in the level of effort from E*1 to E
0
1. Upon this decrease in natural income however, the 
consumer‟s consumption bundle is still on the same indifference curve, but with zero levels of effort. 
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2006) assert that given the initial conditions of a world of endemic violence, 
the benefits of even moderate limits on violence are large enough to gain support from most non-elites as 
well as elites. Since the demand curve of effort for one individual is positively related to the demand curve 
of other individuals (The paradox of violence), this Pareto optimal outcome suggests that the level of 
violence generally decreases. Such a state of limited violence and institutionalised rent distribution may 
provide long-term stability and economic growth, but there is always a caveat about the possibility of 
violence (Bush 1972, and North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). This provides a rationale for the dominant 
coalition to enact institutions which preserve the cooperative, incentive-compatible conditions which 
have given rise to the reduction in violence. In this framework of North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), this 
is an enactment of limited access type of institutions, where access to the political system is circumscribed 
and personalized (North et al., 2013).   
 As such the model doesn‟t predict a final distribution of income, but merely derives Pareto 
optimal conditions in which the level of violence is reduced, which makes sense given the different 
dynamics and variations that limited access order societies come in. Moreover, when there are large 
numbers of people the model predicts that it will be hard to reach the optimal outcome, as the increase in 
participants will be accompanied by numerous Pareto inefficient Nash equilibria, a phenomenon widely 
acknowledged in the collective-choice literature (Mueller, 1989 and Bush, 1972). This model‟s predictions 
are congruent with the analysis of North et al., (2013) of social orders. Specifically, institutional 
development is closely aligned with the logic of violence and accumulation. More especially, violence may 
be a viable means to get results in the short-run, but in the long-run the use of violence is perverse, 
because it entails collateral damage and everyone is more productive in the absence of warfare (North, 
Wallis, Weingast, 2006). This prompts the inevitable need of social order and economic means to wealth 
acquisition.  
Since achieving this requires incentive-compatible restraints among violence specialists, barriers 
to entry in the economic and political spheres of influence are instilled as a result, and these maintain the 
incentive-compatibility conditions among the dominant elite (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2006). In 
addition, limited access ensures that the commitment not to fight among the dominant coalition is 
credible since it maintains incentive-compatibility conditions.  Like the depiction of the transition from 
primitive society to limited access society in North et al (2013), this two-consumer model predicts that for 
a world of anarchy or a primitive access society, characterised by the lack of a monopoly over the 
systemic of violence, a set of rules defining property rights can be developed and applied (Bush, 1972). 
These rights serve to increase the total utility of all individuals in that society because the rules are better 
than anarchy. But, for reasons of stability, driven by the logic of incentive compatibility, access to these 
rules will be the privilege of a few individuals within the dominant coalition, at least initially This is 
because controlling violence depends on the structure and maintenance of relationships among powerful 
individuals (North, Wallis, and Weingast; 2009). This logic of the transition from limited access to open 
access invariably makes the prediction that in the aftermath of wide-spread violent and anarchic 
conditions, characterised by the collapse of the legitimacy on the monopoly of force (i.e. regime change), 







4.  VIOLENCE AND STATE FORMATION 
 
North et al., (2007), assert that almost all theories concerning the role of the state tend to make 
simplifying assumptions, mainly that the state can be modelled as a single actor that has monopoly on 
violence. On this point, Engelbert (1997) argues that as an analytical category, the state is generally 
unchallenged, even though states, particularly poor and developing country states differ enormously from 
states elsewhere, in their configuration and operation. The difficulty with this single actor approach to the 
state is that it assumes away the fundamental problem of how the state achieves a monopoly on violence 
(North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009) . The collective-action problems alluded to above of how individuals 
and groups within a society behave and how a coalition emerges to structure social order, are taken as 
given. Instead of taking the social order as an exogenous entity to institutional development, using the 
theoretical framework of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) as well as some insight from studies of 
anarchy and collective-action game theory, a theory is the state formation is analysed. This will allow us to 
understand the rationale driving the evolution of institutions, and more importantly, their tendency for 
persistence even as they wreak havoc on social welfare and on the state itself. The analysis so far has 
depicted that the problem of violence is fundamental to understanding social and institutional formation.  
This section aims to link how solutions to the problem of violence lead to state formation, specifically it 
aims to show how individuals solve collective action problems with regards to the use of violence and 
how this leads to the social structures and institutions that ensue thereafter.  The goal is to establish the 
extent to which theoretical framework can be used as a lens through which African states can be analysed. 
 
Khan (2012) argues that nation states, as entities that are imperative in the emergence and sustainability of 
growth enhancing institutions, aren‟t homogenous and exogenously given entities, but they are 
underpinned by socio-political and socio-economic idiosyncrasies. The literature argues that, because of 
the dominance of Pareto inefficient outcomes presumptive in collective-action among individuals, 
especially in large groups, an enforcer of collective-action is often necessary (Mueller, 1989 and Khan, 
2012). Olson (1993) and North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) assert that every society with contractual 
organizations must have an organization that provides third party enforcement, whether it uses coercion 
or not. And such an organization has to be formed from purely incentive compatible agreements among 
its members. In this framework, that organization is the state. Achieving legitimacy of authority is not 
easy however, and the use of force in order to „enforce social contract‟ may be perverse towards the goals 
of law and order.  This conception of the state is congruous with the definition of Lonsdale and Berman 
(1979), who define the state as a historically conditioned set of institutions in societies which secure 
conditions for the reproduction of the dominant mode of production, which in the case of African 
colonialism, is Capitalism. To these commentators, the state is the ultimate unit of economic production 
and political reproduction (i.e. social control) (Lonsdale, and Berman, 1979). The state then is to be 
thought of as closely linked to solutions of collective-action problems, its role being to serve as an 
enforcer of social contracts, including the social contract of reduced levels of violence and internal 
instability. Some commentators however, suggest that the roles of the state are mutually contradictory and 
these contradictions tend to be embedded within is institutions. According to Lonsdale and Berman 
(1979), the states‟ regulation of competition between invites dispute within the dominant classes, whose 
cohesion is a condition of their domination. And when violence breaks out, it is typically among elite 
faction networks (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). Furthermore, since state legitimacy is obtained by 
the protection of labour, the provision of welfare services, and the enfranchisement of the working 
classes, all these of contribute to the erosion of elite rents which maintain incentive compatibility not to 
resort to violence (Lonsdale, and Berman, 2009).  
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The social contract, although exigent, it need not be voluntary from all members of society, as 
mentioned and depicted above, it is usually a based on the calculus of economic rent creation and 
distribution by violence specialists rather than based on preferences, thus consent, of the ordinary 
individuals (North et al., 2011; and Khan, 2005). According to Khan (2005), this may explain why the 
electoral competition in some democracies, in general does not result in government preferences being set 
by the poor even though they constitute a huge majority. A somewhat radical description of the state is 
provided by Oppenheimer (1926; in Rothbard, 2009) who asserts that the state is a social institution 
which is forced on a defeated group by a victorious group. Its sole purpose is the regulation of the 
dominion of the victorious group on a defeated group, where the dominion has no purpose other than 
the economic exploitation of the vanquished by the victors, a tone which probably resonates more with 
African states, more so at advent of colonialism. However even in postcolonial Africa, competitive 
politics along ethnic lines can often enable the political elite to favour their own ethnic group with the 
goal of dominating the others. On this note, de Jouvenel (1949, in Rothbard, 2009), in line with Olson 
(1993), argues that the state, in essence, is the result of successes achieved by a band of brigands who 
superimpose themselves on societies. These arguments seem to suggest that contrary to contemporary 
ideals of democracy, state legitimacy is often a top-down, phenomenon, determined by the logic of force 
rather than that of preference, especially at the early stages of state formation. Before elaborating further 
on this point, it is imperative to explain what this dissertation refers to by “legitimacy”. 
 Concisely, to define legitimacy in this dissertation, three words are used, and these are, consent, 
allegiance, and restraint. According to Hume (1748), because human beings are not extremely unequal, 
nothing but their own consent to can make them subjects to an authority, and when government power is 
traced to its foundations, it is found that because people mainly abandon their native liberty for the sake 
of peace and order, and this makes them the source of government power. To Hume (1748), given each 
individual‟s natural strength, nothing but their own consent, and the sense of advantages resulting from 
peace and order could subject multitudes to the command of one government.  Therefore by “legitimacy” 
this dissertation refers to the ability of an authority, such as the government, to obtain the consent and 
allegiance of the people such that the authority is able in turn to impose restraints (i.e. rule of law) on its 
subjects in order to ensure peace, order and security. More importantly, in order to attain legitimacy, an 
authority is judged by its ability to provide the public goods of security and immediate protection (Mehler, 
2004). In addition to violence, other figures of authority often resort to charisma, ideology, symbols and 
agreements on basic normative convictions between the protectors and those protected in order to attain 
legitimacy (Mehler, 2004). The dichotomization between bottom-up legitimacy and top-down legitimacy 
serves to highlight the conditions under which the consent, allegiance, and restraint of the people is 
obtained by an authority.  
The notion of bottom-up legitimacy suggests that people do not owe an authority their allegiance 
and only forego their natural freedom, only on the conditions of a promise of receiving justice and 
protection in return. Therefore if the government repudiates this promise, the people are free to refuse to 
be subjects of that authority (Hume, 1748). Therefore under the notion of bottom-up legitimacy, the 
conditions of consent, allegiance, and restraint are given and obtained voluntarily, given the benefits of 
justice and protection. However, the conceptual frameworks of North et al., (2009), Olson (1993), and 
Rothbard (2009), clearly suggests that this is hardly the case, more especially in the case of a typical 
African country, which this dissertation seeks to analyse. Instead, these frameworks corroborate Hume‟s 
(1748) argument that, almost all governments, of which there is any record, have been founded originally, 
either on usurpation or conquest, without any presence of a fair consent of voluntary subjection of the 
people. This is what the notion of top-down legitimacy seeks to represent, the lack of fair consent in 
subjection, or in other words, government by subjugation instead of government by choice. Here, critics 
might argue that even in subjugation, given the choice between anarchy and order, people eventually 
prefer order, thereby voluntarily choosing to accept being subjects of the foreign conqueror. However, this 
critique precisely highlights the role of violence in state formation, thereby corroborating what this 
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dissertation labels “top-down legitimacy”.  The role of violence in state formation is supported in the 
conceptual framework of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2006, 2007, and 2009). They argue that natural 
states (i.e. LAOs) are a way of matching violent individuals with economic rights in order to create 
incentives to reduce the use of violence and to increase specialisation and exchange. Consequently, this 
dissertation suggests that the notion of top-down legitimacy, can go a long way in explaining the 
persistence of development-perverse institutions in developing countries, even in institutionalised 
democracies, especially if the countries exhibit limited rather than open access social orders. According to 
Lonsdale and Berman (1979)  
On face value it may be hard to comprehend how social-welfare destroying institutions may 
persist. However the notion of top-down legitimacy and the logic of violence may provide some clarity.  
Mehler (2004) argues that conflicts can be an exercise in rational irrationality, where under conditions of 
asymmetric information, it can be a signalling tool which can help in reducing the level of conflict in the 
future, whereupon acquiring a reputation for ruthlessness may benefit a government by deterring future 
opponents from challenging the regime. An individual, to whom this insight is not lost, more especially a 
survivor of civil conflict, may take it into account when deciding to challenge the legitimacy of the 
incumbent regime‟s deleterious policies. Secondly, change is fraught with uncertainty, especially political 
transitions. Bratton and Van De Walle (1994) argue that political instability, ethnic tensions, government 
failure and levels of warlords increase sharply in limited access regimes when the transition doesn‟t 
proceed smoothly. Upon consideration, many who are exploited by state policies will hesitate to push for 
reform because they see disorder and violence as worse outcomes than being exploited economically. In 
Africa these arguments are more likely to hold than elsewhere, where Goldsmith (2001; in Mkandawire, 
2015) asserts that since 1960 and 1999, out of a 180 leadership changes on the continent, 101 took place 
through a coup or some other extra-constitutional means. And, according to Elbadawi and Sambanis 
(2000), 20 countries out of 48 have experienced at least on episode of civil war since independence. Some 
commentators point out that the argument that destructive institutions persist because individuals are 
conflict averse has some limitations. The argument assumes that the costs of free-riding are so low that 
the individual is not incentivised to engage in rebellion or insurgency. This is unlikely to hold in very 
repressive regimes when the economy is too weak and conflict breaks out. Kalyvas and Kocher (2006) 
argue that the ills indiscriminate violence, death, economic collapse, and forced relocation have immediate 
effects on rebels as well as non-rebels.  Furthermore, the death ratio of innocents to insurgents tends to 
be significantly higher in violent conflicts involving counterinsurgencies. Therefore an individual to whom 
this insight is not lost, may seek to improve their odds of death by joining a rebel movement and be part 
of the insurgency (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2006). However, when free-riding costs remain below a certain 
threshold, growth inhibiting institutions may still persist in the long-run and this may present and sustain 
lost opportunities as far as economic development is concerned. 
In Africa, top-down legitimacy is more likely to be serious than other in regions and could 
account for persistence of welfare destroying institutions or policies. The notion of top-down legitimacy 
suggests that the calculus of violence that underpins the preference of the dominant coalition for limited 
access over anarchy is not lost on society at large. Moreover, the logic of violence that encourages 
incentive compatibility conditions among the dominant coalition, hence prompting institutional 
emergence, from the point of view of society, serves to render persistent those emergent institutions. This 
means violence not only plays a role in the emergence of institutions, but it also plays a role in the 
continuance or evolution of these institutions, because given the choice between violent-revolution over 
corrupt institutions may be more costly than exploitation by these institutions. While top-down legitimacy 
may be external to some members of society, in so far as it is dictated by the uncertainty which 
characterises outbursts of violence, Rothbard (2009) argues that a successful device the state uses to prop 
up its legitimacy is to instil fear for any alternative systems of rule or none rule as it supplies a service 
which citizens are grateful for, the protection against sporadic criminals and marauders. Lastly, in the 
framework of social orders, it is presumptive that states cannot emerge under primitive access societies, as 
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this requires a group of individuals with sufficient levels of coercion to be able to impose sanctions on 
groups of individuals whose behaviour deviates from the social contract enforced by the State. Primitive 
access societies, by definition, are severely lacking of such levels of coercion over each other.   
 
4.1 The Postcolonial African State: Governance 
Crowder (1987) argues that in less than 25 years after African independence, the African dream of 
development and progress had been shattered and replaced by a profound disillusion whereby Africa had 
become the world‟s basket case, for which there was little if any hope. Consequently the universal wisdom 
was that African independence was abysmal failure. This assertion begs the question, what is it about 
African independence to which Africa‟s developmental woes can be attributed? According to Engelbert 
(2000), out of all the regions in the word, Africa has the largest proportion of countries where the process 
of state creation was exogenous to their societies, and where its Westernised leadership or ruling class 
inherited the state rather than shaping it as an instrument of its existing or developing hegemony. This 
suggests that African states are superimposed institutions over pre-existing political structures and 
economic structures (Lonsdale and Berman, 1979; and Engelbert, 2000). From the chanceries of Europe, 
state creation in Africa had no reference to African realities, and colonial powers did little to foster a 
sense of national unity within them (Crowder, 1987). Moreover, the lack of historical continuity, and the 
inherited colonial modes of governance embodying the postcolonial African state, renders it somewhat 
arbitrary, if not complicated (Okoth-Ogendo, 1972). This is because the postcolonial state is not 
embedded in pre-colonial institutions and pre-existing forms of political authority and when it diverted 
from the imposed institutional structure during independence, it reverted to the colonial modes of 
governing (Lonsdale and Berman, 1979). Engelbert (2000) argues that that it is this lack of embeddedness 
that accounts for the observable weak economic performance of most African countries. This  implies 
that the relative power payoffs of developmental policies for political elites are lower, hence, some 
commentators argue that the residual root of African stagnation lies in the nature of the African state, 
that is, its lack of legitimacy (Engelbert, 2000 [My emphasis])1. As a result, instead of playing a role in 
development, the postcolonial African state is a venue where political actors bargain over the allocation of 
resources and secure their consumption in weak economies (Hyden, 2006; in Arriola, 2009). However, 
some authors argue that the roots of poverty lie in the colonial period as the colonial state was not run for 
the benefits of its inhabitants, but for that of settlers (Arriola 2009). In white-settler colonies, the main 
agent of exploitation was the African farmer, who was forced to produce crops as the colonial powers 
dictated rather than according to their needs.   Even at the risk of land impoverishment and famine, 
through taxation, forced labour and requisition, the farmers produced crops as the big multinational 
corporations dictated and not according to their needs (Arriola, 2009). 
Okoth-Ogendo (1972) argues that most explanations of Africa‟s widespread breakdown of institutions 
tend to be general, leaving unexplored some basic factors in the operations of constitutional systems in 
the continent. Crowder(1987) suggests that to judge postcolonial Africa, ought to be a judgment passed 
on a dream not manufactured in Africa, but in  Europe, a dream taking no cognisance of either 
contemporary African realities, nor, more importantly, and less forgivable, a legacy of colonial rule. 
Crowder (1987) asserts that in all the British colonies, and Francophone Africa, except for Guinea, the 
transfer of power was negotiated and made conditional on the acceptance of liberal democratic 
constitutions inspired by the metropolitan model regardless of whether the African parties where 
ideologically committed to them. Okoth-Ogendo (1972) argues that these Westminster institutions and 
provisions in the constitutions such as the Bill of Rights contained not normative definitions prescribing 
the purposes of government, such as minimum prescriptions of justice and good governance, but almost 
exclusively focused on the distribution and limitation of power. This was done despite the fact that if the 
                                                     
1 Notice Engelbert‟s idea of legitimacy suggests bottom-up legitimacy in contrast to the analysis of collective action 
and top-down legitimacy given above.  
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institutions were to be altered, they might eventually come to perform normative functions of the 
government, particularly when it comes to establishing and maintaining state legitimacy (Okoth-Ogendo, 
1972). And, since power could only be transferred through the ballot box, the African nationalists 
necessarily had to appear committed to liberal reforms (Crowder, 1987). 
Since new governments needed more powers than their predecessors so they may legitimize their 
rule, the constitutional limitations on the postcolonial state therefore were an invitation to 
unconstitutional action (Okoth-Ogendo, 1972).  Furthermore, given that most of African countries had 
been cobbled only 50 years earlier to independence, Arriola (2009) suggests that in reality, this “dream” in 
which Africans would faithfully adhere to the liberal institutions and uphold a mixed economy in which 
the interests of the interests of ordinary people would be served, was fantastic, but vain hope. This is 
corroborated by Okoth-Ogendo (1972) who argues that in the reasoning of constitutional transplantation, 
the colonial powers imposed upon the postcolonial African regimes, constitutions which depended for 
their stability largely upon the maintenance of good (i.e. based on consent) state-society relations in 
politics, and most elites were simply not prepared to guarantee that. These arguments suggest then that 
the system of democracy in Africa was in fact neither adopted as a result of fair voluntary consent by its 
subsequent custodians nor was it instilled and adopted as such by its subjects. Paradoxically, even though 
the system of democracy seeks to instil a political structure whereby authority is a result of fair voluntary 
consent (i.e. by free and fair elections), its origin in Africa was dictated not by the consent of ordinary 
Africans, but by the logic of violence between the African nationalists, other native militant groups, the 
settlers, and the colonial government (Meredith, 2005). The extension of franchise in colonial Africa, and 
as a result, the emergence of the postcolonial African state, more often than not, occurred at the 
background of civil unrest, rebellions,  guerrilla warfare, and civil war against the injustices of the colonial 
system and the need for “self-governance” (Meredith, 2005; and Onyango, 2014). This suggests then that 
the post-colonial African state was founded on top-down legitimacy and the use of violence in order to 
legitimate one‟s rule has merely continued, rather than emerged, in postcolonial Africa.  
According to Arriola (2009) the colonial state was not only conceived by violence, but it was maintained 
by the use free use of it, and therefore if anything, the colonial state provided a model for its inheritors 
that government rested not on consent but on force. Moreover, Mehler (2004) argues that from a 
historical perspective, there is nothing particular with state weakness in Africa because power was rarely 
absolute in the colonial past. Ellis (1999; in Mehler 2004) asserts that in colonial Africa, different power-
holders used to share responsibility and thus authority, in most communities and states. Some 
commentators argue that a legitimate monopoly on violence did not exist at all even in pre-colonial 
Africa, where oligopolies of violence and therefore a high level of violence was the historical norm 
(Trotha, 2000 and Bangoura, 1996; in Mehler, 2004). Given the lack of continuity in authority in the 
political transition of African state from a colony to a sovereign nation, it is suggestive that this new 
democratic system of governance may have enacted institutions that its intended subjects and custodians 
failed to find credible and viable. And, since credibility is pertinent for political institutions to avoid 
instability, this suggests that it is reasonable to assert that at inception, postcolonial African states were 
embarking on a path of inevitable instability (Fedderke and de Kadt, 2000). This argument is 
corroborated by Okoth-Ogendo (1972) who argues that as the result the pressures they imposed on the 
powers of the elite, the constitutions of the early postcolonial state were inherently fragile. Lastly, 
Crowder (1987) argues that when judgment is passed on postcolonial regimes in Africa, we must remind 
ourselves that some of the most extreme forms of violence perpetrated in post-colonial Africa have been 
by the whites of Rhodesia and South Africa. Consequently, Arriola (2009) suggests that if anything, the 
colonial state provided a model for its subjects that government authority rested not on consent but on 
force. Therefore the blame for postcolonial Africa‟s situation should be divided between its leaders and 
their colonial predecessors. 
 
4.2 The Postcolonial African State: Legitimacy and Patronage 
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According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997; in Arriola, 2009) the patron-client relationship is the 
principal mechanism regulating political and economic life in postcolonial African countries. On the 
determinants of this mode of organizing political economy relations, the literature argues that from 
independence, African regimes lacked legitimacy, were exogenous to their societies, and they were not 
historically embedded into domestic relations of power and domination. As such the literature suggests 
they suffered from a dichotomization between power and statehood. The African „inheritance elites‟, were 
handed the colonial state but not the colonial power that forged it and kept it together (Engelbert, 2000). 
Furthermore, for ruling elites, power was fragile, and therefore the consolidation of power became the 
prime motive of action, sometimes at the cost of institutions, as leaders resorted to the use of corruption, 
clientelism, nepotism, regionalism and other forms of factionalism (Engelber, 2000; and Arriola, 2009). 
Factionalism became an instrument of achieving legitimacy, replacing the state with an informal web of ad 
hoc political alliances. Accordingly, it is suggestive that a lack of state legitimacy favours 
neopatrimonialism policy choices (Engelbert, 2000, and 1997). Consequently, Bratton and Van de Walle 
(1994) assert that the distinct institutional hallmark of African regimes is neopatrimonialism, where 
decision making is typically restricted within a narrow social base. 
 Bratton and Van De Walle (1994) define a system of patronage as a hierarchic structure 
encompassing an executive at the top. This executive maintains authority through personal patronage 
rather than through rule of law. Below the executive are the patrons whore are loyal to the executive and 
solidify its rule, in return for benefits in kind (Bratton, and Van De Walle, 1994). The key characteristic of 
neopatrimonial regimes is the personalization of power, where the state is treated as an extension of the 
property of the leader (Khan, 2005; and Wegner, Merchergui, and Mechergui, 2013). According to 
Wegner, Mechergui, and Mechergui (2013), the concept of neopatrimonialism was introduced as an 
attempt to analyse a new type of institutionalization and governance in postcolonial Africa. 
Neopatrimonialism differs from traditional patron-client relationships in the notion of predictability. 
Whereas policy tends to be predictable under traditional patronage systems, under neopatrimonialism, 
political and economic policy is highly and uncertain and precarious (Eisenstadt, 1973; in Wegner, 
Mechergui, and Mechergui, 2013). Consequently Engelbert (2000) asserts that neopatrimonial policies 
lead to widespread distortions in market mechanisms because of its tendency to allocate resources along 
political rather than economic criteria. When resources are allocated along these lines, economic policy 
favours current consumption at the expense of investments in physical and human capital which have few 
immediate returns to the dominant coalition (Engelbert, 2000). However, other commentators do not 
support this view.  
Firstly, Mkandawire (2015) refutes the view that neopatrimonialism has become the convenient, 
all-purpose and ubiquitous sobriquet for African governance, and therefore a logical outcome of its poor 
economic performance. Instead the author argues that empirically the view of decline and stagnation as 
the norm in African economic history is not supported, despite what the logic of neopatrimonialism 
suggests. The actual trajectory of Africa‟s postcolonial development is captures not by a downward 
sloping or inverted-U curve, but is captured by an N-shaped curve of economic growth, and by ignoring 
this cross-sectional and longitudinal variance of the African experience, the neopatrimonial view provides 
a poor understanding of the complexities of the continent (Mkandawire, 2015). Furthermore, contrary to 
some of the assertions of the “neopatrimonialism school” that attribute Africa‟s economic woes to 
corrupt and bloated African regimes, Sachs et al., (2004) assert that many parts of Africa are well governed 
even though they are stuck in poverty. These authors assert that African regimes are stuck in a poverty 
trap, meaning they are too poor to achieve and maintain strong and high levels of economic growth 
(Sachs et al., 2004). And according to Khan (2012), no developing country has actually succeeded in 
implementing good governance at levels of per capita income seen in Africa. Therefore, contrary to the 
argument that Africa‟s developmental woes lay in bad governance, even the well governed African 
countries failed to achieve and sustained levels of economic growth and development (Khan, 2012). 
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Additionally, contrary to the neopatrimonial view of a bloated state, African governments tend to be 
smaller than is commonly suggested (Mkandawire, 2015).  
In contrast to arguments that assert that neopatrimonialism crows-out investment in social 
services such as health and education, the evidence suggests that, controlling for  the standard 
determinants of social expenditure, African countries spend more on education and health than would be 
expected given their levels of income and structural characteristics (Mkandawire, 2015). This is 
corroborates Crowder‟s (1987 arguement that African countries have made significant strides in 
increasing primary school enrolment, access to water, housing and healthcare, life expectancy and literacy. 
(Mkandawire, 2015), argues, economic policy is a complex process that involves ideas, interests, economic 
forces and structures, path dependence and institutions, therefore it cannot be merely reductively derived 
from the logic patronage systems. Lastly, Mkandawire (2015) argues that the view that the state might be 
illegitimate undermines the success of nationalist movements in creating new social contracts that evolved 
from the main social movements and social compromises. Therefore, the neopatrimonialism lens of 
diagnosing Africa‟s problems is too blunt and too formulaic an instrument for understanding the variety 
of African experiences which encompass contradictory interests and ideologies (Mkandawire, 2015).Far 
from having a deleterious effect on social cohesion and development, other authors regard African 
neopatrimonialism as a politically, hence economic, stabilizing factor, where it‟s been strategically 
deployed by African leaders to consolidate their regimes since independence (Engelbert, 2000 and Arriola, 
2009).  
According to Khan (2005), patronage not peculiar to African countries, moreover, unlike in 
advanced countries,  political stability in developing countries is primarily maintained not through fiscal 
policy, but through the largely off-budget and selective accommodation of factions organized along patron-
client lines [my emphasis].  Furthermore, historically all developing countries undergoing developmental 
transformation entail features of patronage systems (Khan, 2012). Therefore, in contrast to being 
deteriorative to the outcomes of development policy, patronage is seen as an instrument for regulating 
intra-elite competition, permitting the leader to ration state resources in placating aggrieved groups, or 
punishing would-be challengers, a point which resonates with the argument made above that patronage is 
a system of steps undertaken to arrive at the solution of violence or instability (Arriola, 2009 and North et 
al., 2011). Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) corroborate this argument, arguing that after independence in 
Africa, dominant parties usually used patronage to consolidate power. During independence power was 
consolidated by limiting access to the political system to both civil society and political opposition. In the 
absence of a dominant party, ensuing regimes tended to be characterised by instability and a greater 
reliance on the use of violence, especially through military solutions to political problems (Bratton and 
Van de Walle, 1994).  
In its stabilizing role in Africa, patronage facilitated the integration of ethnic representatives, 
bureaucrats and business leaders into a cohesive elite, a dominant coalition, united by their common 
interest in accessing the state resources on which their positions depend (Arriola, 2009). That is, 
patronage became an instrument to achieving incentive compatibility among the political elite with direct 
access to violence to form a dominant coalition which used limited access in the political system to 
manipulate the economic system. These arguments are congruent with the theoretical framework of 
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), where the system of patronage is used to create rents for the elite, 
such as struggle heroes, military generals, militant groups, and even leaders of the opposition, in order to 
consolidate and concentrate power at the centre of the executive. These means however come at a cost of 
open economic and political institutions (North et al., 2012). This however does not necessarily imply that 
the detriment of open political and economic institutions inhibits economic development because rents 
do have a positive role in economic development (Khan, 2007; in North et al., 2012). Khan (2013) argues 
that the good governance agenda, characterised by the emphasis on the rule of law, democratic 
institutions, and strong property rights as drivers of economic development, ignores the problem of how 
to maintain political stability in developing countries. By ignoring the problem of political stability, the 
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good governance agenda does not give elites a workable reform agenda in developing countries. All 
LAOs face the problem that they cannot have open access to the political structure or market without 
endangering regime stability (Wegner, Mechergui, and Mechergui, 2013) This dissertation suggests that 
this ignorance stems from failing to acknowledge that the states are not exogenous entities but are 
dependent on their socio-political and socioeconomic peculiarities, and these too have a role to play in the 
outcomes of economic policies with regards to economic development. 
 Furthermore, there are significant structural constraints in developing countries which hinder 
stability of property rights. This is because property rights are an expensive public good, and therefore 
require significant levels of development and resources to ensure their stability (Khan, 2012). In advanced 
countries almost all private assets are productive and their owners pay significant taxes for the provision 
of this public good. In contrast, in developing countries the capitalist economy is under-developed and 
most of the economic activity takes place informally, hence the tax base to generative revenue for the 
general protection of all assets as a public good does not exist in most cases (Khan, 2012). In contrast to 
developed countries, conditions that enable transparent and impersonal redistributive political activity, 
such as a well-developed capitalist economy, have not been attained in developing countries. Khan (2012) 
argues that democracy is an end in itself and ought to be supported only on these grounds. When instead, 
democratization is supported in developing countries because it is believed it is a mechanism that reduces 
rent-seeking and corruption, there is much room for disappointment (Khan, 2012). Democratization does 
not undermine patrimonial politics because the organization of patron-client factions driven not by the 
absence of democracy, but by the structural features of the economies of developing countries that make 
impersonal, open, and welfare redistributive policies unviable (Khan, 2005). Conflicts over resources in 
developing countries tend to be intense, particularly between powerful factions of elite coalitions, and this 
contributes to the fragility of democracy (Khan, 2012). The presence of different elite coalitions 
organized along factional lines in developing countries is such that, democratic systems in these countries 
works differently in the modern Weberian states. In developing countries the most powerful 
organizations tend to be the patron-client factions.  When they get elected to public office they invariably 
renege on their campaign promises of open, responsible and transparent governance. Instead they to tend 
to abuse public power abuse power for private gain and impede the efficient allocation of public 
resources as much, if not more than their predecessors (Khan, 2012).   
 
5.  GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS IN KENYA 
 
5.1 Governance in Pre-Independence Kenya 
Although numerous postcolonial states turned into autocratic regimes after having been established on 
democratic political philosophy, characterised by open political and economic institutions, the general 
framework of social orders is scarcely used to analyse the evolution of their institutions (Wegner, 
Merchergui, Merchergui, 2013). This section analyses emergence and evolution of institutions in Kenya 
during the colonial and postcolonial periods. The development trajectory of Kenya continues to be 
determined by the intersection of pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial socio-political and economic 
processes (Ndenge, 2009). Moreover, when it comes to the political features of colonial states, in addition 
to economic roles, questions of the basis of its legitimacy, citizenship and authority can throw light on 
modern political dimensions of underdevelopment (Murphy, 1984). Therefore this time period should 
provide observations that enable a thorough investigation of political and economic issues facing modern 
age Kenya. Although much of this analysis is concerned with colonial and postcolonial Kenyan 
institutions, a brief description of pre-colonial Kenya may provide some context in understanding 
colonial and postcolonial Kenyan society. Lonsdale and Berman (1979) characterise pre-colonial Kenya as 
a web of subsistence economies that exploited local ecologies suited to predominantly pastoral or 
agricultural production systems. As a result agriculture was the main source of income. Furthermore, 
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ethnic boundaries were insignificant2, and cattlemen and cultivators had a symbiotic system of exchange of 
commodities. Although pre-colonial Kenya was inhabited by a variety of ethnic groups, the Cushites, the 
Nolitics, and the Bantu, none established themselves as a kingdom (Phagudom, 2014; and Letete 2015). 
In the 16-17th centuries Arab and Persian traders overran the Portuguese and colonized the east coast, 
where major port city-states were developed to stimulate trade. This led to the introduction of Islam 
among the native population and this influence the emergence of the Swahili culture and language (Bell, 
2012). 
 From 1888 the imperial British East Africa Company penetrated the region, after which 
profound transformation was to take place as the indigenous Kenyans were subsequently linked to the 
capitalist mode of production and world economy (Lonsdale and Berman, 1972). When the British East 
Africa Company collapsed in 1895, the British Foreign Office assumed responsibility for governance and 
in the mid-1890s the British established the East Africa Protectorate, subsequently to become the Kenya 
Colony four decades later (Bell, 2012). Upon declaring Kenya a protectorate, the British had to have their 
authority accepted by the Kenyans, and the British were convinced that this required establishing a strong 
and efficient administrative system (Onyango, 2014). In order to establish and maintain their authority 
however, the British first had to convert superior coercive power (i.e. monopoly of violence) into a 
legitimate authority accepted by the Kenyans, and often, mediation occurred through pre-existing and 
emergent relations of power (Lonsdale and Berman, 1979; and Murphy, 1984). In order to achieve 
legitimacy along traditional lines, in its early years the colonial state sought out tribal chiefs, and were 
there were none, it created them (Murphy, 1984). Although the institution of the chieftainship was 
derived from traditional modes of governance, in colonial Kenya, chiefs became a creation by the colonial 
powers to serve as agents of the local administration, thereby serving to extend the arm of the colonial 
state at the periphery of power (Mumdani, 1996; in Onyango, 2014). Consequently, the system of indirect 
rule was enacted, and the colonial state created local native councils and native tribunals with the 
intention of suppressing political aspirations among the Africans (Murphy, 1984). In order to govern 
Kenya then, the colonial state relied on top-down legitimacy and patronage because the logic of conquest 
was such that little or no consent from the Africans was considered in the establishing a social order, 
apart from considerations of potential conflict (Lonsdale, and Berman, 1979). Murphy (1984) argues that 
the authority of the colonial state cannot be said to be „legal authority‟ in the sense that its legitimacy is 
based on the acceptance of rationalised rules regulating the rise to, and the use of authority (i.e. bottom-
up legitimacy). Furthermore, interest representation was not based on plurality, and a system of public 
rights concerning speech and association, and an impartial rule of law, to a great measure, was denied to 
Africans (Murphy, 1984)  
 Ochieng (1985; in Onyango, 2014) asserts that initially, the British did not go to Kenya to settle, 
but in order to reach the wealthy Kingdom of Buganda, and to do this they planned to build a railway 
from Mombasa to Kampala, thus unavoidably passing through Kenya. The railway was completed in 
1901 at a cost of £ 5.5 million (convert to today‟s value) and afterwards settlers and traders began to 
move to the interior of the Kenya, and colonial administration expanded to provide other administrative 
services for the settlers, including the provision of security. The imperial insistence that colonies be 
financially self-sufficient, in turn gave an impetus for sovereign self-interest in the colony (Lonsdale, 
Berman, 1979). In addition to the costs of the railway, there were also costs of conquest. Nearly a third of 
the Protectorate‟s budget in its first nine years was spent on military costs, and its overall costs exceeded 
local revenue (Lonsdale and Berman, 1979). Given the mandate of financial self-sufficiency, the colonial 
state had to find new sources of revenue to finance the operating costs of the railway, and this resulted in 
the introduction of the Hut Tax and the colonization of the rich highlands by the Europeans by driving 
the Africans off their land (Onyango, 2014). When it came to generating fiscal revenue, the chiefs came in 
                                                     
2 Phagudom (2014) asserts boundaries along ethnic groups were porous, suggesting that they weren‟t as rigidly 
defined as they became to be under colonial administration. 
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handy for the colonial administration. The chiefs became the means through which the colonial power 
imposed itself on the Kenyans. They assisted colonial governance in collecting Hut and Poll taxes, 
helping to provide cheap labour for the colonial administration and the settlers, and in maintaining order 
in their spheres of influence (Onyango, 2014). 
 The pressure of financial self-sufficiency for the colonial governors, as well as the civilizing 
mission of colonization entailed contradictions when it came to colonial governance. In order to generate 
accumulate assets for revenue generation, in addition to the imposed taxes, the colonial state practiced 
primitive accumulation on the settler‟s behalf by appropriating African land, forcing out labour, and 
confiscating livestock. This   mode of primitive accumulation however, threatened to erode whatever 
legitimacy the colonial state had (Lonsdale and Berman, 1979). In its civilizing mission, the colonial 
administration perceived Kenya a “white man‟s country” (Onyango, 2014). This, among other things, 
entailed “civilising the heathens”, and establishing a secure white dominion, founded on the principles of 
the British tradition and Western civilization. Eventually, the presence of Africans in their own country 
was ignored or forgotten (Onyango, 2014).  Ironically, even though the colonialists had come to think of 
themselves as having some interests in educating and converting the “primitive tribes”, in reality they 
carried out their civilizing mission based on their “superiority” over the “tribes”, and had no interest in 
understanding the Africans‟ cultures (Onyango, 2014). What resulted then, was a system of racism and a 
pre-modern notion of authority (i.e top-down legitimacy) where those deemed too “uncivilised” to have 
rights came to be ruled by those who deemed themselves to have the right to  judge them as such 
(Murphy, 1984). Race over class, became a layer of qualification, and therefore the colonial state treated 
some of its citizens more equal than others, an act which put it in a state of contingent anarchy 
(Nolutshungu, 1982; in Murphy, 1984). As a result if Kenya was to be a “white man‟s country” with a 
African majority, then it had to be based on a racially segregated economy (Murphy, 1984). As the 
number of settlers grew, they organized themselves into a number of associations, and these, among 
other things, were directed to keeping the highlands and most lucrative real estate reserved for whites, 
organizing African labour for the benefit of the settlers, and developing an acceptable system of land 
tenure (Onyango, 2014) 
 According to Onyango (2014) throughout the colonial period, commerce was exclusively 
promoted for the benefit of the settlers. Some authors point out however that this characterisation is too 
simplistic to account for the complexities of the colonial state. Murphy (1984) asserts that the colonial 
state was distrustful of settler greed, and deemed itself to have the responsibility of acting as a mediator 
between settlers and Africans. Given the diametrically opposed interests of settlers and Africans, where 
the former accumulated assets at the expense of the latter, the colonial state‟s role was to try to guard 
African welfare and development and to organize these two groups into a coherent and harmonious 
society. It was unclear however whether this meant protecting Africans from settler exploitation and self-
interest or protecting them against modernity and development as such, which included the ills of 
capitalism such as individualism, on the „organic‟ African community (Murphy, 1984). These roles that the 
colonial state played were the source of the contradictions embodying its governance. As an alien 
institution, in the long-run it needed consent and could not rely on force in order to maintain its authority 
over the Africans. But given the goals of European expansion and needs of financial independence from 
the metropolitan, the solution was to appropriate African assets and capital (including labour) and hand 
them to the settlers to cultivate for export markets. This however subjected the colonial administration‟s 
authority to crises of legitimacy, and made sustained social order hard to achieve (Murphy, 1984; and, 
Onyango, 2014). Moreover, according the extraction of African labour had the risk that it might foster a 
cohesive consciousness of class over the fragmented consciousness of the „tribe‟ (Lonsdale and Berman, 
1979),. Another contradiction was embodied in the fact that state intervention against the African 
population coincided with the rising level of conflict between the settlers and officials of the colonial 
administration who were determined to defend African interests against the settlers (Lonsdale, and 
Berman, 1979). Therefore, the colonial state was not simply an instrument of settler class rule, and when 
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at times it prevented African capitalism it did so based on its other contradictory logics than on ensuring 
settler interests (Murphy, 1984). The colonial state in its particular distrust of settler-greed, constantly 
refused to grant the settlers their cherished aim of self-governance, which in the context, meant a South 
African solution (i.e. de jure racial segregation and white minority rule) to the dilemmas of colonial 
exploitation (Murphy, 1984). However, the  prevention of African capitalism by the colonial state in turn 
created the conditions for the convergence of the working class nationalists and populist demands, which 
among others, led to the Mau-Mau, later to become a civil war (Murphy, 1984). 
By the end of the mid-19th century, the colonial state had still failed to achieve sustained bottom-
up legitimacy, as many Africans, especially those who were violence specialists in WW2, were still 
disgruntled with the exclusive institutions of the administration that took their land and gave it to the 
settlers. Moreover, the Africans were unhappy with the restrictions that came from the creation of 
reserves, the imposition of hut and poll taxes, and especially with the labour system where the chiefs 
forced villagers to provide cheap labour for the settlers (Onyango, 2014). As such, after high levels of 
violent conflict experienced during the Mau-Mau period and increased African political consciousness, in 
1959, with Europe still in post-WW2 recovery and European imperial appetite waning, the Kenyan 
colonial state removed barriers to the formation of national political organizations. Consequently, the 
struggle for the postcolonial state began, dominated by the African nationalists comprised of earlier anti-
colonial organizations and a political elite emerging in the post Mau-Mau period (AJulu, 2002). After long 
consultations in London, it was realised that a proper involvement of Africans in the administration was 
crucial for peace to prevail in Kenya. And, instead of the multi-racial state under British dominion, that 
the settlers had hoped for, in 1963 the British granted Kenya independence on the basis of a Westminster 
model constitution which championed open political and economic systems with minimal barriers to 
entry, and the protection of minority interests (Onyango, 2014). 
 
5.2 Governance in Postcolonial Kenya 
The rest of this section deals with a brief discussion on governance in postcolonial Kenya, from the year 
1963 to 2010, divided between the presidencies of Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), Daniel Arap Moi (1978-
2002), and Mwai Kibaki 2002. Kenya‟s political transition from colonialism to independence was 
relatively smooth and stable (Ahluwalia, 1984).  In order to establish, consolidate their rule, and achieve 
bottom-up legitimacy, first generation leaders of dominant parties during the initial era of competitive 
party politics in postcolonial Africa often employed their parties to distribute patronage to a wide range of 
economic interests, and Kenya was no exception (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994). In contrast to the 
expectations of the masses, the new political order brought by the independence struggle, differed little 
from the old colonial order. Upon independence, the behaviour of African politics was similar to that of 
office-seekers who do so to promote personal advancement and profit. Relative to their colonial masters, 
Africans were less idealistic, more practical, and even cynical about the prosperity and stability that open 
political and economic systems at independence supposedly entailed (Crowder, 1987). Under the first 
head of state Jomo Kenyatta, the patronage system used by the colonial state was found particularly 
conducive to the consolidation of political power. The first three years of independence were utilized on 
political and economic recruitment, mostly of Kenya‟s largest and relatively educated ethnic group whom 
Kenyatta hailed from, the Kikuyu. The Kikuyu were recruited to government towards the consolidation 
of power and the creation of a ruling elite coalition (Amutabi, 2009). Supporters of Kenyatta received 
government jobs and land, which had opened up by the exit of the settlers (Mueller, 2008). In order to 
consolidate power, Kenyatta‟s regime passed constitutional amendments which increased personalised 
power in the Presidency, such that by 1968, 10 constitutional amendments had been made, thus 
increasing the power of the executive at the expense of other organs of government (Mueller, 2008). 
Upon consolidating his power, those whom Kenyatta deemed as threats and enemies, some with 
legitimate and loyal constituencies, were regularly harassed by state forces, removed from the echelons of 
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power, or punished with preventative detention laws. All of this was done in order to repress opposition 
politics (Mueller, 2008; and Amitabi, 2009). 
 Consequently, the postcolonial, nationalism-driven, competitive multi-party political structure 
was short-lived, crumbling within 6 years of Independence, with Kenya becoming a de facto, one-party 
state. Later on, ethnicity, rather than policy emerged as the most important factor in political competition 
(Ajulu 2002). While the colonial regime limited access to politics for the benefit of settlers, subsequent 
postcolonial regimes have come to limit access to the political and economic spheres of influence by 
favouring their close ethnic members (Ajulu, 2002). In contrast to an independent structure of governance, 
the postcolonial Kenyan state effectively used politically and economically exclusive institutions of the 
colonial state to govern Kenya, though not to the same extreme as the colonial state. In the political era 
of postcolonial Kenya, strategies of exclusive-politics that favour elite interests along ethnic lines came to 
dominate institutional development (Amutabi, 2009). While the colonial regime practised politics of 
exclusion by favouring the settlers, the postcolonial regimes favoured their close ethnic associates 
(Onyango, 2014). To the extent that consent and internalised knowledge of a political system refers to the 
political culture of a society and the legitimacy of authority, the political culture and order of the 
postcolonial Kenyan state cannot be said to have been based on bottom-up legitimacy (Almond, 2004; in 
Onyango, 2014). Instead legitimacy was attained in a manner that was incongruous with the provisions of 
the Westminster-style constitution of open and competitive economic and political institutions. The new 
path of the postcolonial state to political legitimacy by dispensing patronage and the suppression of 
opposition politics, led to some economic and political institutions to revert towards those of the colonial 
order. As a result, notions of neo-colonialism are deeply embedded in the political structure and culture in 
postcolonial Kenya. For the masses, Independence has not been translated into real economic 
independence and freedoms for much of the postcolonial period (Onyango, 2014). During independence, 
power transfer was conceptualised in an abstract sense, as a result no attempt was made to examine the 
institutional basis of power. Hence upon the transition to Independence, not only the institutions but the 
values of colonial rule were received. What resulted then was a mere substitution of colour, hence 
economic groups and class interests and the corresponding administrative power that sustain them were 
left unaltered (Okoth-Ogendo, 1972).  In essence, a black neo-colonialist replaced a white colonialist, and 
this served to perpetuate the crisis of state legitimacy which plagued the colonial state into the 
postcolonial period. In the postcolonial period the struggle is between the former independence freedom 
fighters comprised of the educated class with a neo-colonial point of view, and postcolonial intellectuals 
and Mau-Mau fighters. The latter believe that their fight to regain land previously taken by settlers was 
stolen by the neo-colonial governing elite who used their power to perpetuate their interests and those of 
former colonial powers (Onyango, 2014). 
Political succession in the postcolonial state is a complex process, involving not only changes of 
personnel and elite coalitions, but also an opportunity for a new style of politics to emerge following the 
demise of the „founding father‟ (Ahluwalia, 1984). When President Kenyatta died in 1978 after 14 years as 
head of state, his Vice-President of 12 years, D.A Moi succeeded him (Ajulu, 2002). And although Moi 
had been loyal to Kenyatta, coming from a smaller ethnic group, the Kalenjin, he was never accepted into 
Kenyatta‟s inner circle, even though to most Kenyans he was widely regarded as the right candidate to 
towards an accommodating political, economic and human rights era with no ethnic dominance (Adar 
and Munyae, 2011). Upon occupying the role as head of state, Moi declared his philosophy as following 
the footsteps of Kenyatta. And thus he began building his power around his Kalenjin and other smaller 
ethnic groups who believed that their turn to exploit the opportunities that came with political power had 
dawned (Onyango, 2014). Contrary to the expectations of most Kenyans who believed that the new state 
ushered in a period of accommodating human rights and a state-enabled environment for citizens to 
exercise their constitutionally guaranteed rights, in the early 1980s, Moi held on to power by making the 
political system more repressive, concentrated the distribution of patronage, and systematically purged 
Kenyatta‟s allies from government (Arrioila, 2009). The abortive coup of 1982 further enabled him to 
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purge the army, as well as political forces that were powerful and outside his control (Ajulu, 2002). Driven 
by the desire to consolidate his power, legitimize his leadership and broaden his political base and popular 
support, Moi criminalized competitive politics and criticism of his leadership. And to ensure his grip on 
power, he systematically seized control of the functions of other institutions of governance. In 1982 with 
the passing of Section 2A constitutional amendment, Kenya became a de-jure one-party state (Mueller, 
2008). Moreover, between 1986 and 1988, parliament passed legislation that imposed limitations on the 
independence of the judiciary, thus rendering the principle of the separation of powers of the 
Westminster model constitution ineffectual (Adar and Munyae, 2001). And by revoking Parliamentary 
privileges which gave representatives the right to information from the office of the president the state 
undermined the legitimacy of representation of the legislature of Kenya, as this meant that members of 
parliament, and by extension their constituents, surrendered their constitutional rights to the Presidency 
and the supremacy of parliament was subjugated to the Presidency and the ruling party KANU (Adar, 
and Munyae, 2001).  
Like Kenyatta, Moi came to rely on a small clique, mostly composed of his ethnic group to 
consolidate his power, such that by the mid-1980s he had mastered the art of patronage and clientelism to 
construct and deconstruct his elite coalition (Ajulu, 2002). Under Moi, patronage and loyalty became 
mandatory for political survival and this remained characteristic of the regimes leadership (Adar and 
Munyae, 2001). In turn, the medium of achieving regime legitimacy in the postcolonial state ushered in a 
political framework based on ethnicity, greed and corruption (Ajulu, 2002). Additionally, given the 
volatility of politics in Kenya and the persistence of ethnic divisions, Moi was confounded with serious 
difficulties as he came to power at a time of growing economic crisis as a result of declining commodity 
prices prior to assuming office (Ahluwalia, 1984). Unlike Kenyatta, who had resources in his disposal to 
disperse as patronage, Moi‟s regime was severely capital constrained, and it had to engage in primitive 
accumulation and predation in order to consolidate support and its power. As such his modes of attaining 
legitimacy were cruder and more repressive than those of Kenyatta, entailing dismantling the economic 
foundations Kikuyu hegemony in order to build Kalenjin privileges into the structure of the state (Ajulu, 
2002; and Mueller, 2008).  
 In contrast to Kenyatta, Moi politicised the allocation of public goods and private investments 
such as roads, educational infrastructure, as well as agricultural investments, with allocation directed 
towards Moi‟s political constituency (Ajulu, 2002). Perhaps more importantly, the primitive accumulation 
that ensued under Moi, fostered a kleptocratic bourgeoisie whose political survival, hence wealth, 
depended on a continuous access and control of an authoritarian state. The type of distribution of rents 
and the crude use of the state for primitive accumulation that occurred under Moi, could only be possible 
through authoritarian control. Additionally, despite the mere appearance of wealth, the significant portion 
of the property of the ruling elite remained mortgaged to the country‟s financial institutions, and losing 
state power meant losing their wealth overnight (Ajulu, 2002). Confronted with prospects of open and 
competitive political processes, as well as public scrutiny and accountability, the ruling elite defended its 
property and class interests through mobilized ethnicity, and it is against this background that the regime‟s 
resort to violence upon the introduction of competitive politics must be understood (Ajulu, 2002). To 
deter its collapse, the Moi regime instituted even greater authoritarian measures, with Moi arguing that 
since Kenya was not „cohesive enough‟, multipartysim would cause chaos. Indeed, when it came to multi-
party politics, Moi detested the idea (Mueller, 2008). Even though it was his government that went as far 
as instigating ethnic violence in order to repress opposition and portray that the multiparty system as 
inappropriate for Kenya, Moi often argued that the resulting instability upon enacting multipartysim in 
the 1990s, following international donor pressure, served to prove him right (Mueller, 2008; and Amutabi, 
2009).  The ethnic violent clashes that occurred during the multiparty period of 1991-1997 under Moi‟s 
regime were not spontaneous outbursts of anger and hatred among Kenya‟s ethnic groups, but were 
engineered political acts by political forces that sought to inhibit multi-party politics (Adar and Monyae, 
2001; Ajulu, 2002; and Mueller, 2008). The regime responded to its critics by having them and even their 
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friends, detained, tortured, and killed (Mueller, 2008). Indiscriminate state and extra-state violence against 
ordinary citizens, particularly the poor and defenceless, was often deployed to shun critics and 
sympathizers of the opposition (Mueller, 2008).  
As mentioned previously however, the use of violence in resource acquisition is fraught with 
paradoxes, in addition to collateral damage, since violence markets have positive-reaction supply 
functions among violence specialists, the use of regular force by a state in order to consolidate its power 
can erode its legitimacy, hence the monopoly over force itself. While Moi‟s state instituted overly harsh 
levels of violence against those who opposed him, state violence inadvertently institutionalised violence 
outside of the control of the state both by design and neglect, and overtime the state could no longer 
control the level of violence. As a consequence, with time the state‟s monopoly over violence began to 
cede (Mueller, 2008). In turn, opposition parties also contributed to the incitement of violence through 
public statements, and everyone from every class was affected as the level of violence rose accordingly 
(Adar, and; Munyae, 2001). The consequence of violent clashes, particularly in northern Kenya, was an 
arms race and a general militarization of ordinary citizens who perceived the need to defend themselves 
when their government did not, or could not (Mueller, 2008). And thus in addition to consent, the state 
lost the allegiance and restraint of the ordinary citizen. Under President Moi, extra-state violence took 
mainly four forms. Firstly, politicians began having their own private bodyguards. Secondly groups of 
young men were used by the state and its politicians kill and displace opposition supporters. Thirdly, 
mafia shakedown gangs began to emerge and operate as shadow states in the slums of the capital Nairobi 
and in other cities, as well as the country sides. Lastly, an increasing generalised level of crime and 
violence began to confront ordinary citizens from the 1980s, and has continued into the new millennia 
(Mueller, 2008). Aptly, Moi‟s rule has been characterised as an imperial presidency that orchestrated and 
deployed an autocratic patronage system that almost totally abandoned the formal rule of law and 
independent institutional checks and balances, resorting instead to a highly personalized presidency that 
paved the way for kleptrocratic rule and gross levels of corruption. Put concisely, President Moi simply 
ignored formal rules that seemed to hinder what he personally wanted, and his regime underpinned a very 
violent period in Kenya‟s history in the 24 years of its reign (Mueller, 2008). 
Under Mwai Kibaki, who took over from Moi in 2002 as state president, things differed little in how 
Kenya was governed from the previous eras of Moi and Kenyatta. Kibaki‟s regime equally and effectively 
utilized his predecessors‟ strategies to maintain himself in power to such an extent that in Kenya there has 
developed a political culture of ethnicity and entrenched corruption (Onyango, 2014). When Kibaki took 
over the government, extra-state violence had not been reined in. The state‟s monopoly over legitimate 
force continued to be eroded and violence continued to be diffused, especially in the after the 2007 
election. The informal rules continued to reward loyalists and punished dissenters, and formal institutions 
outside the executive continued to be deliberately weakened, with grave consequences of depleted 
legitimacy of independence from the executive when it came to resolving the ensuing violent conflicts. 
More importantly, Kenya‟s political parties are not based on clearly defined and distinguished principles, 
as their ideologies, policies and programmes are not particularly salient (Mueller, 2008). This is not 
altogether surprising, given the concentration of Kenya‟s political structure that emerged as a result of the 
colonial state‟s determination to stifle African national political parties and the continued concentration of 
power among Kenya‟s elite coalitions after Independence (Ajulu, 2002).  
Kenya‟s leaders have a history of shifting parties, such that even those in the opposition have 
been in government and cabinets with the incumbent regime‟s elite. As a result of these factors, politics 
and the control of the Kenyan state is viewed as a winner-takes all and zero-sum game that involves the 
capture of the nation‟s resources for the benefit of power consolidation and class interests. This in turn 
serves to increase the returns to violence, especially ethnic-based violence, as ethnicity is seen as a critical 
factor that determines the distribution national economic resources, with the head of state seen as a chief 
ethnic in charge (Mueller, 2008).  The 3 regimes since the formation of the postcolonial state in Kenya 
effectively used the colonial political and economic strategies in governing postcolonial Kenya (Onyango, 
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2014). Moreover, like the colonial state, postcolonial Kenyan states failed to achieve sustained bottom-up 
legitimacy as the impetus of power consolidation resulted in the diffusion of violence, which consequently 
served to erode whatever legitimacy the state had. Even the Kenyatta years were not without violence, 
even in this period there were political assassinations, and preventative detention laws which served to 
suppress opposition politics, as well as regular paramilitary forces which were often deployed to disrupt 
student and political rallies. Albeit this level of violence was controlled by the state (Mueller, 2008). 
Throughout the postcolonial period, competitive multi-party politics were a rarity in Kenya. The first was 
the short-lived period at the dawn of Independence in 1963-1969. The second era began in the 1990s, 
which included the elections of 1993 and 1997 and in both periods, ethnicity was the most important 
factor determining the process and outcome of political competition (Ajulu, 2002).  
Commentators who utilize the framework of social orders to analyse the evolution of institutions 
argue that scholars and policymakers that mainly focus on the formal aspects of institutions, such as 
political parties, parliament, administrative structures, and elections rather than the incentive structures 
that guide the behaviour of their constituent political actors often fall prey to false optimism about 
institutional development in transition economies (Wegner, Mechergui, and Mechergui, 2013) . 
Concentrating on the formal (de jure) nature of institutions often comes at a cost of neglecting how 
institutions really operate in developing countries, and this leads to exaggerated views about how 
institutions both in and outside of government actually function, thus giving a false sense enthusiasm 
regarding the future. As mentioned in the introduction, this false sense of optimism is underpinned by the 
misleading hints of institutional development that result from assuming away the incentive structures that 
are foundational to political stability (Mueller, 2008; and Wegner, Mechergui, and Mechergui, 2013).  In 
contrast to pundits who argue that developing countries are underdeveloped because they lack formal 
market enhancing institutions, regimes in developing countries like Kenya tend to deliberately hollow out 
of formal institutions as state power is attained and maintained through a systemic use of violence. Under 
these conditions, intervention such as a broad based removal of barriers to the political and economic 
institutions in order to enhance market development can be very damaging to political stability (Khan, 
2012). 
 This is because violence in transition economies tends to be embedded in the political competition itself, 
and as argued above concerning one of the many paradoxes of violence, this tends to threaten the 
sustainability of any institutional reform that is devised to control violence. Regimes which have a 
monopoly on violence and that tend to use violence to consolidate their authority, as we have seen in the 
case of the Moi administration, can often find it difficult to maintain their monopoly on violence, 
especially under increasing political competition. This in turn threatens to destabilize the entire socio-
political order, and along with it, even the states‟ top-down legitimate authority. That is, the deliberate use 
of violence in political competition, whether it is aimed at gaining electoral advantage or in maintaining 
political power indefinitely, has the potential to destroy even the integrity of the state itself (Mueller, 
2008). Therefore, attempts at institutional innovation based on formal technical changes to old systems 
are not only likely to be undermined by the prevailing norms but are likely to lead to political disasters, 
involving the deaths of thousands and displacing hundreds of thousands. These views are highly 
consistent with the logic of LAO socioeconomic structures, and suggest that the emergence and evolution 
of political and economic institutions under LAO is driven by endogenous dynamics between political 
and economic institutions on the one hand and violence on the other hand. Looked at this was, the 
reversion of postcolonial state institutional structures to their colonial predecessors is not altogether 








6. EMPIRICAL SECTION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS IN KENYA 
 
This section analyses the transmission mechanism of the limited access order during the colonial and 
postcolonial periods with political and economic institutional data spanning from 1880-2010.  That is, it 
aims to empirically assess how the logic of violence and the management of elite competition propagates 
itself on Kenyan institutions. The data are constructed by Letete (2015) and Letete, Sarr, and Fedderke 
(2018) who describe the subcomponents included as inputs as well as the methodology applied. Since 
both colonial and post-colonial political structures, consolidated their rule by using violence, and imposed 
barriers to the political and economic institutions in order to maintain a cohesive elite coalition, the aim is 
to see the resulting effect on institutional development. In the colonial state, the elite coalition was 
dominated by settler organizations and colonial state administrators, where the latter manipulated the 
economic and political systems in order to create economic rents for the former. Moreover the 
accumulation of economic assets by settlers occurred at the expense of the Africans, who lost both their 
land and freedom over their own labour, among other deprivations of their rights during British rule. The 
colonial state enacted an institutional structure aimed at the extraction of surplus value from the physical 
and human capital of the Africans by limiting African access to political and economic institutions under 
the new social order of colonialism.  In turn, postcolonial regimes, operating under more intense elite 
competition also needed to consolidate their power and prevent elite violence as dictated by the logic of 
the limited access order. The social orders framework predicts that in a limited access order more 
openness to the political and economic spheres of influence would serve to erode the incentives of elites 
not to resort to violence. Therefore, the theory predicts that more open and accommodating institutions 
should result in political instability.  
The data are political, economic institutions, and political instability indices of Kenya from 1880-
2010. Political rights are captured by the Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index (pol_civilib_ind) and 
economic rights are captured by the two indices of property rights, the Freehold Property Rights Index 
(fhpr_ind), and the Non-Freehold Property Rights Index (nfhpr_ind) which measures customary property 
rights. Political instability is captured by the Political Instability Index (pol_inst_ind), and is a proxy for 
the level of violence. The indices are constructed based on the methodology developed by Fedderke et al., 
(2001) and the scaling and the rating of the indices is based on the criteria of Zaaruka and Fedderke 
(2011). Under this scaling, the indices of political rights and economic range from 0 to 100, and 100 
represents an ideal state of property rights and political rights. An ideal state of political rights is defined 
as a state in which the political power of the elites is minimized and that of non-elites maximized (Letete, 
2015). And an ideal state of property rights is defined as a state in which citizens enjoy the liberty to enjoy 
the benefits of wealth while assuming the costs that the benefits entail. The political rights and economic 
rights indices are a weighted average of subcomponents that are calculated based on de jure developments 
that affect each index. The property rights index is a weighted-sum of components that quantify the right 
to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to capital, the right to security, the incident of 
transmissibility and liability to execution. In colonial Kenya, the introduction of the freehold property 
rights system resulted in two distinct property rights systems, whereby freehold property rights were for 
the privilege use of Europeans and customary property rights were for Africans (Letete, 2015). Therefore 
during the colonial period, freehold property rights are referred to as European economic rights, and 
customary property rights are referred to as African economic rights. The Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties Index defined as a weighted-sum comprised of freedoms: voting rights or franchise, freedom of 
association, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, extent of arbitrary executive power, freedom of 
movement, independence of the judiciary and legislature,  academic freedom, limit of government secrecy 
or indemnity, due process of law, freedom of religion, and others. The “others” category captures the 
political rights and civil liberties that cannot be classified under the above factors. Values of the index 
between 51 and 74 imply that there is a recognition of political rights and civil liberties and some 
constraints on arbitrary state power, and ranging from 38 and 50 implies that arbitrary state power is 
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partially constrained but legal provisions of personal freedoms is weak. Values between 13- 37 imply that 
there significant arbitrary power is granted to the state and most individual rights and freedoms are not 
recognised. Finally a score ranging from 0 to 12 implies a de-jure totalitarian state. 
 Figure 3. Kenyan Economic Rights and Political Rights Indices, and Political Instability Index (1880-2010) 
 
The index of political instability ranges from 0-20, with values approaching 20 indicating high levels of 
instability. This values of this index can be seen on the left vertical axis of figure 4.  The index is a 
weighted sum of the subcomponents which measure the number of politically motivated prosecutions 
under emergency regulations, the number of political fatalities, people placed in detention, banned 
organizations and publication, actions against „riots and protests‟, and declarations of official states of 
emergency, as well as the number of reported cases of damaged property due to political violence (Letete, 
2015). Therefore in addition to being the proxy for the level of violence, the political instability index can 
be regarded as a measure of state legitimacy, with higher values of the index depicting the erosion of 
bottom-up state legitimacy.  
 
Figure 3 plots the economic and political rights indices on the vertical-axis on the left and the political 
instability index on the vertical-axis on the right for the entire sampling period.  Within the graph there 
are vertical lines in 1895, 1963, 1978, and 2002 which denote the start of the colonial state, the Kenyatta, 
Moi, and Kibaki regimes respectively. The data depict that upon the advent of colonialism, the freehold 
property rights index increased sharply as settlers required a secure and established property rights system 
in order to settle and produce in the colony. This coincided with a decrease in customary property rights. 
The deterioration of African land rights under this period is to be expected given that the promotion of 
African landholding was in conflict with the development of the settler economy. Using Lonsdale and 
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Berman‟s (1979) analogy, the colonial state was laying the foundation for securing institutions that 
produce social conditions congruous to capitalism, the dominant mode of production. In the first 40 
years of colonial rule, African economic rights, as measured by the Customary Property Rights Index, 
decreased from a peak of 57 in 1888 to reach an all-time low of 16 index points in 1928. At the same time 
the magnitude of this decrease in African economic rights is nearly matched one-for-one by the increase 
in European economic rights as the Freehold Property Rights index increase from a low of 28 to a high 
of 71 index points in 1928. In the ensuing years of colonialism, African economic rights remained 
relatively low and stable, improving marginally after the Mau-Mau period, but remaining below 50 index 
points until the early 1960. In contrast European economic rights continued to increase throughout the 
colonial period, reaching 83 index points by the 1960s. Figure 4 below depicts that while access to the 
economic system for Europeans was expanded during the colonial period, for Africans, access was 
extremely circumscribed. Moreover, even though African land rights improved in the postcolonial period, 
they nonetheless never reached the 60 index points mark. Indeed, since from the colonial period, the 
economic rights of the indigenous population had weak legal provisions and have been constantly under 
threat from arbitrary state power. This seems to not be the case only during the Kibaki administration. 
Figure corroborates this argument, depicting that the deterioration in African economic rights coincides 
with the increase in arbitrary state power, more so during the Moi era (arbitrary state power is read on a 
less is more basis). What stands out from these figures is that the advent of colonialism was accompanied 
by an emergence of institutions that where congruous of capitalism-based mode of wealth accumulation, 
albeit at the expense of indigenous economic institutions. Moreover, this crowding out of indigenous 
institutions occurred at the background social-class engineering, in which the individuals of native descent 
were barred from benefiting from access to the the productive incentives that capitalist institutions allow, 
while at the same time, their mode of production was to a significant systematically sabotaged in order to 
generate labour supply for the capitalist system from which they were prevented to benefit. The initial 
effect of colonialism on institutions can be viewed as the formation and differentiation of elites (i.e 
people of European descent), and non-elites, comprised of the natives. Additionally, the colonial state 
ensured that, by virtue of the superiority of its level of violence, any rule-based system which ensued 
would effectively close access to non-elites, while enriching or improving the economic status of elites. 
What is interesting is that, in addition to the dichotomization of elites and non-elites along the lines of 
violence potential, the colonial state discriminated along the lines of race. 
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Figure 4. Customary Property Rights Index and Freehold Property Rights Index. 
 
 
Figure 5. Customary Property Rights Index and Political and Civil Liberties Index (1880-2010) 
 
Figure 5 above depicts that African property rights and political rights are highly coincidental and may be 
highly correlated as well. Throughout the colonial period, political rights follow the deteriorating trend of 
African economic rights only to sharply increase at the beginning phase of Kenyatta‟s rule. However this 
co-movement is strong during the colonial era and seems to have weakened after independence.  Perhaps 
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regime, a trend which started shortly after Independence during the Kenyatta regime. While political 
rights and customary property rights depict an inverted-U pattern for the period shortly before and after 
independence, figure 4 depicts that freehold property rights remain resilient, remaining above 70 index 
points throughout the postcolonial period. This means that while independence has had a limited 
influence on the access of non-elites to economic and political spheres of influence, elite economic 
institutions have remained resilient over the transition from colonialism.  
In appendix 1, summary statistics and Box-Whisker diagrams are used to analyse the differences of the 
indices across the sampling period. The summary statistics depict that the mean of the political instability 
index is 3 for the whole period. During the colonial period, a mean of for political instability 3.6 is 
recorded, and during independence, a mean of 2 is recorded during the postcolonial period. During the 
whole sample period, the mean of the political rights index is 45, during the colonial period a mean of 
39.7 is recorded, and during independence a mean of 54.1 is recorded, suggesting that on average political 
rights are better after the transition to independence. The freehold property rights index has a mean of 
62.8 for the whole sampling period, a mean of 55.2 during colonialism, and 75.9 during independence. 
Lastly, the customary property rights index has a mean of 38.9 during the whole sampling period, a mean 
of 34.9 during colonialism, and a mean of 45.9 during independence. Depicting the resilience of the 
legacy of European economic rights, the summary statistics show that the standard deviation of the 
freehold property rights index is lower than the standard deviations of the customary property rights and 
political rights indices. Tests of statistical significance of the mean differences were conducted in order to 
analyse if the institutions are a persistent across the two political regimes. In terms of openness and 
stability, the summary statistics presented appendices 1 and 2 suggest that postcolonial Kenya has better 
institutions than colonial Kenya. Tests of statistical significance of mean differences of each variable 
across the colonial and postcolonial political orders suggest that political instability is lower in the 
postcolonial period, and that economic and political rights are higher in the postcolonial period. 
Moreover linear and quadratic plots suggest that the negative relationship between European economic 
rights and African economic rights during colonialism turns positive in the postcolonial era. However, as 
discussed above, in the postcolonial period, the legacy of European economic rights is more resilient to 
change than customary economic rights.  
 Moreover the correlation matrices constructed for the entire sample period depicting pairwise 
correlation coefficients, suggest that freehold property rights are negatively related with customary 
property rights. This negative coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level and is stronger during 
the colonial period relative to the whole period. The data seem to corroborate the argument of Lonsdale 
and Berman (1979) and the observation mentioned above that the emergence of the colonial state 
coincides with the rise of institutions congruous to capitalist modes of production at the cost of 
traditional economic institutions. However this negative correlation becomes positive in the postcolonial 
period, and is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that in postcolonial Kenya, access to customary 
economic institutions coincided with the strengthening of capitalist institutions. Furthermore, the data 
suggests evidence of the predictions of the LAO theory. That is, more openness into the political and 
economic system translates into increased instability. The correlation matrices depict that improvements 
into customary economic rights is positively correlated to political instability, suggesting that more access 
customary economic institutions, comprised of non-elites, leads to high levels of conflict.  However this 
relationship is only significant during the colonial period, and in the postcolonial period, open customary 
institutions translate into reduced instability. This could be interpreted using the notion of state 
legitimacy. It could be that in the postcolonial period, in order for the African nationalist to achieve 
bottom up legitimacy across from traditional leaders, concessions of more autonomy was required. 
Additionally, while the correlation between political liberties and violence is insignificant during the 
colonial period, when the entire period and the postcolonial period is taken into account, improvements 
in political  rights and liberties is negatively correlated with political instability. This implies that more 
open political spheres of influence serves to eliminate violence. This is in contrast to the predictions of 
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the LAO, which sees increased access to political institutions as likely to lead to conflict, due to its 
disruptive effect on elite rent-creation and distribution. Assuming that that the direction of causality goes 
from political rights to violence, this suggests that the dynamics of violence are not only determined by 
elite competition, but the non-elites also play a role in violence and instability, and this affects the 
dynamics of institutions. While the LAO implies that the evolution of institutions is merely determined by 
elite competition, these results suggest that the masses are not just passive, innocent bystanders to the 
process of institutional building. This is to be expected given the Westminster-type constitution adopted 
at independence which may have instilled the notion of representative democracy, as well as a politically 
conscious citizenry that expects state power to be based on consent rather than coercion. 
 
6.1Econometric Methodology 
While the data seem to be congruous with the LAO theory in terms of the interactions between political 
instability, which is a proxy for violence, and political and economic institutions, the theory makes strong 
assumptions concerning the order of causality between the variables. While it is possible that more open 
institutions may lead to more stability (i.e. less violence), it is equally plausible that when conflict breaks 
out the ruling elite may limit access to institutions, and this may equally explain the negative correlation 
between institutions and violence.  This section seeks to empirically assess the order of causation between 
these variables by modelling the time series data as reduced-form and recursive vector autoregressive 
models (VARs). By doing this section seeks to test the hypothesis that increasing access to economic and 
political institutions leads to instability in a developing country, where elite competition allows for 
circumscribed access to such institutions. Since the literature is divided on the functional relationships of 
institutional development, the VAR method only empirically consistent assumptions when it comes to 
modelling institutional development along the dynamics of conflict. Moreover, the reduced-form VAR 
imposes few restrictions on the data and provides a useful characterisation of the distribution of   , the 
vector of our institutional variables. Additionally since violence is at the centre of the LAO theory, 
political instability will be made endogenous in order to understand how political and economic 
institutions interact with violence to influence the future paths of each other.  In the algebraic 
relationships can be presented as:  
                          
Where: 
      is a vector of random variables and its elements are the economic and 
political rights indices as well as the political stability index 
   : is a square coefficient matrix (j=1,2,...p) 
    : is a vector of error terms 
While univariate models have to be examined for stationary before they are fitted, the stationarity of VAR 
requires a stability condition that is tested only after the VAR is estimated. The appropriate order of the 
regressors was selected based on the forward prediction error and information criteria, and after several 
models estimated, an appropriate lag order of 2 was identified after several information criteria were 
analysed for several lags. This lag length will allow us to see the how well instability explains the evolution 
of economic and political institutions, and in turn how these affect the level of instability. This will allow 
us to evaluate the hypothesis of the LAO framework, namely that in states with low levels of 
development and feeble bottom-up state legitimacy, more access in the economic and political spheres of 
influence will lead to increasing instability. The results are presented in table 6 in appendix 4.  
 
6.2 Results 
In in investigating the institutional transmission mechanism of the LAO, that is, whether and how open 
access to the economic and political spheres of influence lead to violence and political instability, three 
VAR models were estimated. Here the results are presented, and they exclude the autoregressive 
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components of the equations as this dissertation seeks to analyse the response of institutions to changes 
in other institutions rather than to past values of themselves. The first model covers the entire sample 
period 1880-2010, the second VAR covers the colonial period (1880-1963), and the third VAR covers the 
postcolonial period (1963-2010). The results from these models are tabulated in appendix 4. Results from 
the freehold property rights index equation during the entire sample period, only political instability is 
significant. The index is significant at the 5% level and has a positive sign. That implies that an increase in 
the level of political violence, serves to improve freehold property rights. This sign corroborates the 
argument made above concerning the emergence of political consciousness after independence. This 
result could be reflective of the role of freehold property rights in elite formation, especially in the 
postcolonial state. During the colonial period this sign is negative and significant at the 10% level. In the 
postcolonial period the second lag of customary property rights and political instability are both 
significant at the 5% level and have a positive sign. In the customary rights equation, during the whole 
sample period none of the explanatory variables are significant. While during colonialism, only political 
rights are significant at the 5% level and have a positive sign, suggesting that an improvement in political 
rights is correlated with an increase in African economic rights.  In the postcolonial period, at the 5% 
level, only the second lag of political instability is statistically significant in explaining customary property 
rights and the sign is positive, suggesting that increased levels of violence translates into better customary 
property rights institutions.  
In the political instability equation, from which we can test the predictions of the LAO theory, the results 
show that during the entire sampling period only  the freehold property rights index variable is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in explaining political instability and the sign is negative for the first lag and 
positive for the second  lag. These results suggest that, for the entire sampling period, recent opening of 
economic institutions translates into decreased levels of violence, while more accommodating economic 
rights in the distant past might be destabilizing to the political order. During colonialism it is found that 
both economic rights indices are significant at the 5% for the first lag in explaining political instability. 
While the sign is negative for freehold property rights, it is positive for customary economic rights. This 
implies that in the colonial period, more open access to customary economic rights was correlated with 
more instability. In the postcolonial period, only the economic rights indices are statistically significant in 
explaining political instability. The results show that, at the 5% level of significance, the first lag of 
freehold property rights is negatively related to current levels of political instability. That is, increases in 
freehold property rights in the previous year, translates into improved political stability in the current year. 
Like the freehold property rights index the sign is negative for the first lag of customary property rights 
index, the coefficient is significant at the 5% level. Additionally, coefficient of the second lag of the 
customary property rights index is significant at the 1% level and is positive. These results seem to affirm 
the hypothesis of the LAO, whereby increasing levels of openness to economic institutions lead to more 
instability. Lastly, in the political rights and civil liberties equation, during the entire sampling period, at 
the 5% level, only customary property rights are statistically significant. The sign is positive, indicating 
that improved customary property rights are correlated with improvements in political rights. This result 
seems to validate the notion that customary property rights mainly affect political economy aspects of 
non-elites. During colonialism, neither violence nor economic institutions are statistically significant in 
explaining the conditional expectation of political rights and civil liberties. In the postcolonial period, at 
the 5% level, only customary property rights are significant in explaining variations in the average value of 
political rights. However, while the coefficient of the first lag of customary rights is positive and 
significant, the coefficient of the second lag is negative and also significant. While the sign of the first lag 
coefficient is the expected positive value, the sign of the second lag coefficient is negative. This result may 
be explained by the observation that improvements in the distant past, of economic rights seem to 
correlate with current levels of political instability, and this instability maybe accompanied by a worsening 






6.3 Diagnostic Checks, Impulse Response Functions, and Discussion. 
The eigenvalues of the companion matrices pertaining to each of the three VARS depicted in Appendix 4 
are all within the unit, suggesting that there is no sign of non-stationarity in the VAR, and the VAR can 
be said to be stable. Moreover, a Lagrange Multiplier test for residual autocorrelation suggests that there is 
no autocorrelation in the residuals of the VARs. The Wald lag-exclusion statistics suggest all the lag 
lengths of the VAR are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. When political structure is 
taken into account, such that the model differentiates between the colonial and postcolonial period, the 
residuals show evidence of first order autocorrelation. Hence, the VAR model that covers the entire 
sample period is retained as this allows an examination of institutional dynamics over a long period of 
time. In order to ascertain the order of causation3, a Granger causality test was performed and appendix 3 
presents the cross correlograms of the data. The test suggests that the economic institutions, customary 
property rights and freehold property rights indices do not Granger cause each other, however past levels 
of high traditional property rights are correlated to current levels of freehold property rights. This 
suggests that the, zero-sum game that emerged during the colonial era between African development and 
European development has remained persistent, though upon independence, the European was replaced 
by an African elite. While political instability does not Granger cause freehold property rights, the 
correlogram suggests that past level of political instability are associated with slightly positive levels in 
freehold property rights. Moreover past improvements in property rights are highly likely to lead to 
decreased levels of current instability. In turn, the freehold property rights system Granger causes political 
instability.  
The results suggest that political rights and freehold property rights do not Granger cause each 
other, but when political rights are high in the past, current levels of freehold property rights are likely to 
be low. This is an interesting finding because it is expected that these two variables be positively 
correlated with each other. Furthermore, while political rights and African economic rights do not 
Granger cause each other, past values of political rights are positively related with current values of 
African economic rights, vice-versa. Political instability and African economic rights also do not Granger 
cause each other, however distant improvements in African economic rights is negatively correlated with 
current levels of political instability. Lastly, the causality test, suggests that political rights do Granger 
cause political instability. However, while recent improvements in political rights are negatively correlated 
with current levels of political instability, recent levels of violence serve to deteriorate political rights. 
The results from these causality tests were then used to order the dynamic response functions of 
these indices.  Two sets of orders were used, and the first assumes that economic institutions precede 
economic institutions, while the second assumed that political institutions precede economic institutions.  
                                                     


















































pol2eco2: nfhpr_ind -> fhpr_ind
 
Figure 6. Recursive VAR OIRFs : African Political Rights (Impulse) 
 
All the response functions depicted in figures 15 and 16 in appendix 4. The first set of ordered impulse 
response functions show that past shocks to economic rights are positively related to current levels of 
economic rights. Moreover past shocks to political rights have a positive effect on current political and 
economic rights, and they tend to lead to increasing levels of stability, that is, low violence. The same 
holds for freehold property rights, past shocks tend to lead to increased levels of current property rights 
and political rights, as well as decreased instability. The exception pertains to African economic rights, like 
the other indices past improvements to African property rights are likely to result in improved current 
political rights and freehold property rights, b. This may suggest that in Kenya, granting economic rights 
to Africans is destabilizing to the incentive compatibility conditions among violence specialist that lead to 
reduced levels of violence over time. This may suggest that economic rights of the Africans are disruptive 
to the rent-seeking process of Kenya‟s ruling elite coalition. This also suggests that because the 
postcolonial state inherited economic institutions that are hostile towards indigenous economic rights, 
African economic rights continue to be undermined in the postcolonial period and their improvement is 
disruptive to the political order. The second set of impulse response functions (IRFs assumes that 
political rights precede economic rights. The while the response functions are unanimous on the effects 
of most past shocks, data suggests that the results are sensible to the choice of ordering. For example, 
figure 6 depicts that while positive shocks to African political rights in the first order lead to positive 
improvements in freehold property rights, when we assume that political institutions precede economic 




















































pol2eco2: pol_inst_ind -> pol_civilib_ind
 
 
Figure 7.Recursive VAR OIRF: Political Instability (Impulse) 
 
 
African economic rights lead to a deterioration of political rights. However both orders suggest that 
improvements in African rights do lead to increased levels of political instability. And while this increase 
decreases in the first order, in the second order past increases in African political rights lead to increasing 
levels of political instability. The instability driven IRFs in figure 7, depict that increases in political 
instability lead to increased levels of economic rights. However, shocks to political instability serve to 
deteriorate political rights. While both orders of the IRFs depict this deterioration, if we assume that 
economic institutions precede political institutions the results suggest that the negative response is short-













The research question being addressed in this dissertain was to see how the logic of limited access 
manifests itself in the institutional dynamics of Kenya. The core hypothesis of the limited access order 
framework is that open access to political and economic spheres of influence at early stages of 
development with precarious state legitimacy over the monopolization of force will lead to more 
instability. A key finding while exploring this hypothesis is that, by inheriting the colonial institutions and 
retaining them to enhance the legitimacy of their authority, postcolonial states also inherited the 
contradictions embodying colonial rule. The data suggests that while improved market enhancing 
economic rights and political rights lead to increasing political stability, improvements in African 
economic rights lead to increased instability (i.e. high levels of violence).This result is reflective of the 
structural incompatibilities between capitalist modes of accumulation, which favour elites and insiders at 
the cost of non-elites. Like in colonial Kenya, in postcolonial Kenya, more openness to customary 
economic rights is associated with increasing levels of political instability. That is, nature of the LAO in 
Kenya suggests that improved African economic rights are incompatible with the political order. Further 
research is needed in order to ascertain whether this a result of the disruption of the patronage system 
separating elites from non-elites, a disastrous land reform policy, or a combination of both. However, 
while the postcolonial state has retained colonial institutions, the data suggests that political and economic 
rights are higher in the postcolonial period than in the colonial period. Lastly, while economic 
development literature suggests that improvements in property rights lead to decreased uncertainty and 
higher economic development as the level of investment increases. This dissertation found that in 
developing countries improving economic rights like freehold property rights may actually make it easier 
for governments to instil regimes of patronage and in turn subjugate the economic rights of the masses. 
This is because, freehold property rights systems can make it easier to mould an elite coalition and 
therefore make it easier to discriminate against non-elites. And in the long-run this may serve to stifle 
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Box 2: Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index 
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Plot 3:Economic Rights Scatter: Colonialism.  
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Matrix 1: Scatter Matrix of Kenyan Institutions and Political Instability Indices (1880-2010)  
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Table 1: Political Instability Index 
Political Instability Index (0-20) 
Regime Mean Range Skewness SD Kurtosis 95% CI 
Colonialism 3.6 16 0.98 4.3 2.9 2.66   4.54 
Independence 2 12 1.6 2.8 6.3 1.25 - 2.87 
Total Period 3 16 1.3 3.9 3.7 2.36 - 3.71 
 
Table 2: Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index (0-100) 
Regime Mean Range Skewness SD Kurtosis 95% CI 
Colonialism 39.7   42 1.2 14 2.9 36.68- 42.79 
Independence 54.1 43 -0.8 13.4 2.4 50.22- 57.99 
Total Period 45 48 0.4 15.4 1.5 42.34- 47.66 
 
Table 3: Freehold Property Rights Index  
Freehold Property Rights Index (0-100) 
Regime Mean Range Skewness SD Kurtosis 95% CI 
Colonialism 55.2    84 -0.8 25 2.6 49.73-  60.67 
Independence 75.9 17 0.68 4.6 2.5 74.58- 77.25 
Total Period 62.8 87 -1.4 22.5 4.1 58.91- 66.68 
 
Table 4: Nonfreehold Property Rights Index 
Customary Property Rights Index (0-100) 
Regime Mean Range Skewness SD Kurtosis 95% CI 
Colonialism 34.9 41 0.36 14.7 1.7 31.74-38.14 
Independence 45.9 19 -0.2 6.5 1.47 43.97- 47.74 












 Fhpr_ind Nhfpr_ind Pol_inst_ind Pol_civilib_ind 
Fhpr_ind 1    
Nfhpr_ind -0.3186*** 1   
Pol_inst_ind  -0.0146    0.1177 1  
Pol_civilib_ind -0.3065*** 0.7927*** -0.2355*** 1 
Matrix 1: All periods (obs: 131) [ *** -> Significant at the 1% ; ** -> Significant at the 5%] 
 
 Fhpr_ind Nhfpr_ind Pol_inst_ind Pol_civilib_ind 
Fhpr_ind 1    
Nfhpr_ind -0.6798*** 1   
Pol_inst_ind    0.0876 0.2616** 1  
Pol_civilib_ind -0.8487*** 0.8043*** -0.1285 1 
Matrix 2: Colonialism (obs: 82) [ *** -> Significant at the 1% ; ** -> Significant at the 5%] 
 
 Fhpr_ind Nhfpr_ind Pol_inst_ind Pol_civilib_ind 
Fhpr_ind 1    
Nfhpr_ind 0.8406  *** 1   
Pol_inst_ind 0.0449 -0.0590 1  
Pol_civilib_ind 0.5541*** 0.7070*** -0.2967** 1 











Table 5: Hypothesis Tests of Mean differences between Independence (1) and Colonization (0) 
Assumption 1: Unequal Variances 
     5.1 Political Instability Index: diff= mean (0)-mean (1)=1.54 
Null: diff=0 
t-stat Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0    Ha: diff > 0 
54 
 
2.46 Pr(T < t) = 0.9926   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0149 Pr(T > t) = 0.0074 
 
 
a. Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index: diff=mean (0)-mean (1)=-14.37 
Null: diff=0 
t-stat Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0    Ha: diff > 0 
-5.8208 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000     Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
b. Freehold Property Rights Index : diff= mean (0)-mean (1)=-20.71 
Null: diff=0 
t-stat Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0    Ha: diff > 0 
-7.3186 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000     Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
c. Customary Property Rights Index: diff= mean (0)-mean (1)= -10.91 
Null: diff=0 
t-stat Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0    Ha: diff > 0 
-5.85 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000     Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
Assumption 2: Equal Variances 
Table 5.5 Political Instability Index: diff= mean (0)-mean (1) = 1.54 
Null: diff=0 
t-stat Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0    Ha: diff > 0 
2.21 Pr(T < t) = 0.9857   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0286   Pr(T > t) = 0.0143 
 
Table 5.6: Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index: diff=mean (0)-mean (1)= -14.37 
Null: diff=0 
t-stat Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0    Ha: diff > 0 




Table 5.7: Freehold Property Rights Index : diff=: diff= mean (0)-mean (1)= -20.71 
Null: diff=0 
t-stat Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0    Ha: diff > 0 




Table 5.8: Customary Property Rights Index: diff=: diff= mean (0)-mean (1)= 10.91 
Null: diff=0 
t-stat Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0    Ha: diff > 0 
-4.8807 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000     Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 Political instability is higher during colonial period. 
 Political rights and civil liberties are higher in postcolonial period.  
 Economic rights are higher in the postcolonial period.  
 
APPENDIX 3. CROSS CORRELATION PLOTS 
 


























































































































































































































   Plot 
6: 
Political Instability and Freehold Property Rights Correlogram 
 
 













































































































Figure 8: Customary Property Rights Index and Political Rights Correlogram 
 



















































































































































































































Figure 10:  Political Instability Index and Political and Civil Liberties Index Correlogram 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 VAR: RESULTS, DIAGNOSTIC CHECKS AND IRFs 
 
Selection Criteria 
Lag LL LR Df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -1778.85  16  4.6e+07 28.9894 29.0265 29.0808   
1 -1222.45 1112.8 16 0.000 6981.72* 20.2024* 20.3881* 20.6596* 
2 -1208.39 28.122 16 0.031 7211.61 20.2339 20.5682 21.057 
Table 6. VAR selection criteria 
 




Regressor Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| 
Fhpr_ind     
 Fhpr_ind:    
       lag 1 .8915308 .0882627 0.000 
       lag 2 . 0 5 9 3 9
9 1  
. 0 8 5 8 1
0 7  
0 . 4 8 9  
 Nfhpr_ind    
     lag 1 . 1 0 1 8 5
7 1  
. 1 3 8 5 0
7 8  
0 . 4 6 2  
     lag 2 -
. 1 4 4 7 6 4 7  
. 1 3 6 8 3
9 1  
0 . 2 9 0  
 Pol_inst_ind    
     Lag 1** . 2 3 0 6 8
1 8  
. 1 1 1 6 2
0 8  
0 . 0 3 9  
     Lag 2 -
. 1 1 0 7 9 4  
. 1 0 9 7 6
2 8  
0 . 3 1 3  













































































































    Lag 1 . 0 5 1 6 0
0 8  
. 0 7 0 8 9
0 2  
0 . 4 6 7  
    Lag 2 -
. 0 2 8 6 4 0 9  
. 0 7 2 9 9
2 1  
0 . 6 9 5  
     
 Constant 4 . 0 7 6 0
1 1  
1 . 7 1 6 8
0 7  
0 . 0 1 8  
Nfhpr_ind     
 Fhpr_ind:    
       lag 1 . 0 2 1 3 9
4 8  
. 0 5 6 7 4
7 3  
0 . 7 0 6  
       lag 2 -
. 0 0 2 6 4 7 1  
. 0 8 7 9 7
8 9  
0 . 9 6 2  
 Nfhpr_ind    
     lag 1 1 . 0 8 7 9
1 3  
. 0 8 9 0 5
1 7  
0 . 0 0 0  
     lag 2 -
. 1 4 2 1 7 2  
. 1 3 6 8 3
9 1  
0 . 1 0 6  
 Pol_inst_ind    
     Lag 1 . 0 5 7 8 2
6 5  
. 0 7 1 7 6
5 1  
0 . 4 2 0  
     Lag 2 . 0 3 6 2 4
2 1  
. 0 7 0 5 7
0 5  
0 . 6 0 8  
 Pol_Civilib_ind    
    Lag 1 . 0 5 6 7 0
9 1  
. 0 4 5 5 7
7 9  
0 . 2 1 3  
    Lag 2 -
. 0 1 0 2 2 5 8  
. 0 4 6 9 2
9 3  
0 . 8 2 8  
     
 Constant -
1 . 4 5 9 4 9 9  
1 . 1 0 3 7
9 8  
0 . 1 8 6  
Pol_inst_ind     
 Fhpr_ind:    
       lag 1** -
. 1 4 8 1 2 5 2  
. 0 6 7 7 4
8 2  
0 . 0 2 9  
       lag 2** . 1 3 0 7 4
4 1  
. 0 6 5 8 6
6 1  
0 . 0 4 7  
 Nfhpr_ind    
     lag 1 . 0 7 0 6 1
4 9  
. 1 0 6 3 1
5  
0 . 5 0 7  
     lag 2 -
. 0 0 0 6 5 1 1  
1 0 5 0 3
4 2  
0 . 9 9 5  
 Pol_inst_ind    
     Lag 1 . 3 9 2 6 3
3 1  
. 0 7 1 7 6
5 1  
0 . 0 0 0  
     Lag 2 . 2 8 4 8 8
7 2  
.  
0 8 4 2 5 1 1  
0 . 0 0 1  
 Pol_Civilib_ind    
    Lag 1 -
. 0 6 6 8 1 2 4  
. 0 5 4 4 1
3 5  
0 . 2 1 9  
    Lag 2 -
. 0 0 8 5 7 2 5  
. 0 5 6 0 2
6 9  
0 . 8 7 8  
     
 Constant 2 . 8 4 1 2
7 9  
1 . 3 1 7 7
7 7  
0 . 0 3 1  
Pol_civilib_ind     
 Fhpr_ind:    
       lag 1 . 0 6 3 3 3
2 5  
0 . 1 1 2 8
9 4 9  
0 . 5 7 5  
       lag 2 -
. 0 4 6 0 9 7 5  
. 1 0 9 7 5
8 6  
0 . 6 7 4  
 Nfhpr_ind    
     lag 1** . 3 6 4 1 0
2 1  
. 1 7 7 1 6
2 2  













-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Real
Roots of the companion matrix
     lag 2 -
. 2 6 4 7 2 1 8  
. 1 7 5 0 2
7 9  
0 . 1 3 0  
 Pol_inst_ind    
     Lag 1  -
. 1 5 2 9 6 0 2  
. 1 4 2 7 7
1 7  
0 . 2 8 4  
     Lag 2 -
. 1 2 1 0 2 6 5  
. 1 4 0 3 9
5 1  
0 . 2 1 7  
 Pol_Civilib_ind    
    Lag 1 1 . 0 1 2 8
4 9  
. 0 9 0 6 7
4 1  
0 . 2 1 9  
    Lag 2 -
. 0 0 8 5 7 2 5  
0 9 3 3 6
2 6  
0 . 1 9 5  
     
 Constant -
. 1 3 0 6 5 9 4  
2 . 1 9 5 9
2 9  
0 . 9 5 3  
 




S a m p l e                  :   1 8 8 2  -  2 0 1 0                    N u m b e r  o f  o b s       
=   1 2 9  
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d        =   - 1 3 0 2 . 3 9 7                      A I C                         
=    2 0 . 7 5 0 3 3  
F P E                       =    1 2 0 8 5 . 1 7                      H Q I C                      
=    2 1 . 0 7 4 6 1  
D e t ( S i g m a _ m l )      =    6 9 0 9 . 7 3 7                      S B I C                       
=    2 1 . 5 4 8 4 2  
 
 
























VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION 2 1880-1962 
 




Fhpr_ind     
 Fhpr_ind:    
       lag 1 .8668696 .1072723 0.000 
       lag 2 . 0 2 8 1 4
8 1  
. 1 0 6 2 1
9 1  
0 . 7 9 1  
 Pol_inst_ind    
     Lag 1** . 3 9 2 3 5
2 8  
. 1 7 7 1 5
7 8  
0 . 0 2 7  
     Lag 2* -
. 2 9 8 2 4 2 6  
. 1 0 9 7 6
2 8  
0 . 0 8 9  
Nfhpr_ind     
 Nfhpr_ind    
     lag 1 1 . 0 8 0 3
2 1  
. 1 1 0 1 5
6 1    
0 . 0 0 0  
     lag 2 -
. 1 4 2 1 7 2  
. 1 3 6 8 3
9 1  
0 . 1 0 6  
Pol_inst_ind     
 Fhpr_ind:    
       lag 1** -
. 1 2 7 2 5 3 6  
. 0 6 3 5 5
2 6    
0 . 0 4 5  
       lag 2 . 0 9 8 8 6
1 4  
. 0 6 2 9 2
8 6  
0 . 1 1 6  
 Nfhpr_ind    
     lag 1** . 2 7 8 0 5
4 1  
. 1 2 0 5 3
9 6  
0 . 0 2 1  
     lag 2 -
. 1 8 2 4 6  
. 1 2 1 0 5
8 4  
0 . 1 3 2  
 Pol_inst_ind    
     Lag 1** . 4 8 9 7 3
2 6  
. 1 0 4 9 5
5 6    
0 . 0 0 0  
     Lag 2** . 2 3 8 7 0
9 4  
0 . 0 2 2  0 . 0 0 1  
Pol_civilib_ind     
 Pol_Civilib_ind    
                  Lag 1 1.345539 .0999053 0.000 
    Lag 2 -
. 4 4 8 1 6 1 7  
. 1 0 5 3 4
8 7  
0.000 
     
 
* *  S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  
5 %  l e v e l  
*Significant at the 10% level 
   
 
Sample:  1882 - 1962                                         Number of obs     =         81 
Log likelihood    =  -760.2957                           AIC               =   19.66162 
FPE                   =   4079.783                           HQIC              =   20.08859 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   1671.079                           SBIC               =   20.72582 
 
 









Lagrange Multiplier Test  [Null: No autocorrelation at lag order] 
Lag chi2 df Prob>chi2  
1 9.8000 16 0.87686   
2 13.9920 16 0.59931 











Regressor Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| 
Fhpr_ind     
 Fhpr_ind:    
       lag 1 .7215738 .1789044 0.000 
       lag 2 -
. 2 1 7 5 0 1 2  
. 1 4 7 8 7
0 2  
0 . 1 4 1  
 Nfhpr_ind    
     lag 1 . 0 5 9 9 0
5 3  
. 1 0 4 2 7
7 8  
0 . 5 6 6  
     lag 2** . 2 6 3 6 9
9 9  
. 1 1 3 1 7
1 6  
0 . 0 2 0  
 Pol_inst_ind    
     Lag 1 . 0 9 2 9 5
4  
. 0 8 3 8 2
9 4  
0 . 2 6 7  











-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Real
Roots of the companion matrix
63 
 
1 8  3 8  
Nfhpr_ind     
 Nfhpr_ind    
     lag 1 . 8 8 4 6 4
2 3  
. 1 5 3 9 2
8 8  
0 . 6 8 8  
     lag 2 . 2 1 6 2 4
9 4  
. 1 6 7 0 5
7 4  
0 . 8 3 3  
 Pol_inst_ind    
     Lag 1 . 0 4 9 6 0
8 2  
. 1 2 3 7 4
4 1  
0 . 4 2 0  
     Lag 2** . 0 3 6 2 4
2 1  
. 1 0 7 5 8
6 8  
0 . 0 4 4  
Pol_inst_ind     
 Fhpr_ind:    
       lag 1** -
. 6 3 4 1 9 1 9     
. 2 8 8 4 6
3  
0 . 0 2 8  
       lag 2** . 0 2 9 2 6
5 5  
. 2 3 8 4 2
4  
0 . 9 0 2  
 Nfhpr_ind    
     lag 1* -
. 3 0 9 1 4 4 5  
. 1 0 6 3 1
5  
0 . 0 6 6  
     lag 2** . 7 5 4 9 3
4 2  
. 1 8 2 4 7
6 4  
0 . 0 0 0  
 Pol_inst_ind    
     Lag 1 . 1 4 8 0 9
8 8  
. 1 3 5 1 6
5 4  
0 . 2 7 3  
     Lag 2 . 2 7 0 8 6
1 8  
. 1 1 7 5 1
6 9  
0 . 0 2 1  
Pol_civilib_ind     
 Nfhpr_ind    
     lag 1** 1 . 0 4 6 3
1 8  
. 4 4 5 3 5
9 8  
0 . 0 1 9  
     lag 2** -
1 . 4 1 6 5 6 1  
. 4 8 3 3 4
4 4  
0 . 0 0 3  
 Pol_Civilib_ind    
    Lag 1 . 7 8 2 1 8
0 9  
. 1 3 8 9 3
0 5  
0 . 0 0 0    
    Lag 2 . 0 5 4 4 7
7 2  
. 1 4 2 6 7
3 9  
0 . 7 0 3  
 
**  S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  5 %  l e v e l  
*  S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  1 0 *  l e v e l  
 
 
S a m p l e :                1 9 6 3  -  2 0 1 0                       N u m b e r  o f  o b s      
=          4 8  
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d       =   - 4 3 0 . 6 9 1 6                      A I C                        
=    1 9 . 4 4 5 4 9  
F P E                      =    3 3 3 4 . 0 2 4                      H Q I C                     
=    1 9 . 9 7 5 8 3  
D e t ( S i g m a _ m l )     =    7 3 0 . 6 8 0 9                      S B I C                      
=    2 0 . 8 4 8 8 9  
 
 










































1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
year
freehold property rights index political instability index
Freehold Property Rights and Violence
 
 



















-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Real















































1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
year
political rights and civil liberties index freehold property rights index


































































pulse variable, and response variable
 
Figure 16. Recursive VAR OIRFs 
